Politics, Perceptions, and Performance in Higher Education by Rutherford, Amanda N
POLITICS, PERCEPTIONS, AND PERFORMANCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
by 
 
AMANDA NICOLE RUTHERFORD 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
Chair of Committee,   Kenneth J, Meier 
Committee Members,  Ann O’M. Bowman 
    Manuel P. Teodoro 
    Guy D. Whitten 
Head of Department,  William R. Clark 
 
 
May 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Subject: Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 2015. Amanda Nicole Rutherford  
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation includes three studies devoted to disentangling the effects of 
managers—defined as university presidents—in four year institutions of higher 
education.  In the United States, higher education as a whole is experiencing much 
uncertainty in a consistently changing external environment.  State allocations have 
dropped substantially, forcing many colleges and universities to become more dependent 
on private funding and student tuition.  At the same time, stakeholder groups have called 
for higher levels of accountability throughout the higher education sector in hopes of 
improving national standards of access, quality, and affordability.  This funding 
instability and the political saliency of education have forced the leaders of these 
institutions to become part-politicians while determining how to strategically maintain a 
share of a competitive market.  Drawing from political science and public administration 
theories, I examine whether and how presidents develop strategy and whether 
differences in managerial backgrounds have any effect on how institutions are managed 
using multivariate analysis on cross sectional time series data from research universities 
in the United States. 
 The research in this dissertation builds upon organizational-environmental fit 
literature to determine whether the fit between presidents’ former and current institutions 
has any effect on student retention, graduation, or degree completion.  Findings imply 
that some fit is good but too much fit has negative consequences for performance.  
Additional analyses focuses on determining whether presidents implement strategic 
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change or simply manage incremental shifts in institutional revenues, expenditures, and 
pricing given the current demands of the external environment.  Interestingly, little 
strategy is detecting, suggesting that decision making aggregated at the institutional-
level is perhaps random.  Finally, this research explores the nonlinear determinants and 
effects of administrative intensity, a non-monetary phenomena often determined by 
presidents.  Some types of administrative intensity can be helpful for boosting student 
performance but, this type of staffing can also have a negative effect on performance if it 
exceeds at given threshold. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: MANAGEMENT AND CHANGE IN HIGHER
EDUCATION 
1.1 Environmental Change in U.S. Higher Education 
Questions of educational equity continue to be at the forefront of scholarly 
research as K-12 and higher education systems evolve in response to economic, 
environmental, and cultural shifts in societies around the world.  In the United States, 
recent recessions have created an environment for educators characterized by tightening 
budgets and limited resources.  The market for higher education now includes public 
schools, private non-profit schools, and for-profit online schools; given this competition, 
institutions must prioritize some goals over others to survive and potentially benefit from 
a market-based system.  Though this industry was largely viewed as a private good for 
more privileged socioeconomic classes when higher education first became available in 
the states, it has since become viewed as a publicly available good that should be 
accessible to all traditional and non-traditional students (Priest and St. John 2006).  
Maintaining postsecondary education as an available good, however, has become 
more challenging in the twenty-first century (Toutkoushian and Hillman 2012).  
Following the escalation of tuition prices and uncertainty in the quality of outcomes in 
higher education, state and federal governments have implemented a number of 
mechanisms to regulate these organizations more than ever before.  In addition to coping 
with federal regulations regarding employees, the environment, and finance, institutions 
of higher education must meet federal requirements concerning tax purposes and 
charitable giving, immigration rules, data reporting, campus safety, the Drug-Free 
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Schools and Communities Act, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA), and Title IX.  These federal regulations are further compounded by a host of 
state-level mandates that include admission requirements, scholarship programs, 
elaborate reporting systems, and smoking bans. 
These changes have introduced unprecedented environmental instability in 
institutions of higher education, challenging the decision-making abilities of 
administrators in their efforts to balance the multiple, often competing demands of 
policymakers.  While similar challenges have been studied in reference to K-12 
organizations, higher education may provide a more compelling arena to study the 
decision making processes of administrators facing environmental uncertainty owing to 
the compounding of increased regulation with greater market pressures.  While K-12 
schools must compete, in a sense, with charter or private schools, colleges and 
universities are now dependent upon revenue from core education, research, and service 
functions to sustain market pressures (Bok 2003, Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, Rhoads 
and Torres 2005).  As the trend towards privatization continues, institutions have 
become more dependent on finding new sources of revenue (i.e. student tuition, patents 
and royalties, and alumni donations).  Scholars and policymakers alike have gone so far 
as to argue that public universities have gone from state-supported to state-assisted to 
simply state-located (Morphew and Eckel 2009).  
While scholars have provided descriptive accounts of the trend towards 
privatization in postsecondary education and have investigated the causes of 
organizational reform in these institutions (Nicholson-Crotty and Meier 2003; 
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McLendon, Heller, and Young 2005; McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton 2006), there 
remains a need for understanding the linkages between managerial responses to greater 
regulation and the consequences for equity, quality, and affordability of educational 
opportunities for students.  How do administrators prioritize institutional goals?  What 
drives the variance observed in managerial strategies across institutions?  How do 
decisions by these administrators affect performance across different groups of students?  
I argue that the strategies pursued by managers in universities and colleges to buffer 
their organizations from external changes are shaped by individual values that are 
formed through previous experience, expertise, and socialization processes.  For 
example, a president hired from another institution of higher education or from an 
industry outside of education is likely to manage institutions differently as compared to 
internally promoted candidates.  Likewise, an individual socialized in a PhD program 
and who has created an academic research record may have priorities that vary from 
those who have worked up the ladder solely through administrative roles.  These 
differences in values can create drastically different priorities and action plans that have 
a variety of implications for performance, defined broadly, in these institutions, 
particularly when performance and accountability are paramount. 
1.2 Organizational Decision Making and Performance 
This dissertation is situated at the intersection of theories related to 
environmental turbulence and managerial values.  Empirical chapters will draw 
primarily from person-environment fit, upper echelons theory, and the direction of 
causality between bureaucracy and performance to illustrate that current assumptions 
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about management-performance relationships do not hold.  While the following 
empirical chapters focus primarily on the variance in internal management, this 
introduction also discusses the broader role of external shifts that affect internal decision 
making processes. 
Upper-level administrators are responsible for assessing their organization’s 
environment and responding with appropriate strategies to meet a variety of goals 
(performance, efficiency, equity).  The ability of (public) managers to correctly assess 
the environment varies but can be vital for the survival of the organization.  At times, the 
external environment may shift rapidly, making managerial assessments and responses 
even more important for organizational stability and success.  These rapid shifts are most 
commonly associated with the term “turbulence” in existing literature (Dess and Beard 
1984, Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 1988, Meyer 1982).  Further, Glazer and Weiss (1993) 
define a market with environmental turbulence as “one with (1) high levels of 
interperiod change (in magnitude and/or direction) in the ‘levels’ or values of key 
environmental variables and (2) considerable uncertainty and unpredictability as to the 
future values of these variables.”  From these two factors, the terms “environment” and 
“uncertainty” can also be defined.  First, as noted by Hall (1977), organizations operate 
in two environments.  The task environment is specific to the organization while the 
general societal environment consists of multiple factors that affect all organizations.  
Though the differences between these two environments are not always evident, 
turbulence often includes the influence of the general societal environment on the task 
environment (Kast and Rosenwig 1979).  When this occurs, uncertainty can threaten the 
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stability and performance of the organization.  Second, organizational theorists have 
identified three primary sources of uncertainty (Duncan 1972, Leblebici and Salancik 
1981)—the lack of information about factors in the environment that may affect decision 
making, the lack of knowledge about the effects of a decision, and the inability of the 
decision maker to determine whether an environmental factor will affect the success of 
the organization.  This dissertation will focus on the second source of uncertainty, 
namely the inability of the manager to know how a decision will affect the success of the 
organization in a complex setting with multiple goals.  
Theories of decision making have evolved from the normative expectation that 
managers will rationally consider all options and consequences (Braybrooke and 
Lindblom 1963) to a model of satisficing (Simon 1947).  I argue that especially in times 
of turbulence, managers satisfice and make decisions rapidly.  Though these decisions 
can be costly, the failure to determine strategies quickly (i.e. no action) may become 
more costly than a decision that is not the “best” option.  As related to theories of 
resource dependencies, I assert that changes in the external environment causes a shift in 
resources.  This leads to a strategic decision by mangers to do nothing, seek new 
resources, or change internal operations to support the new level of resources received.  
Each of these three options can be implemented in a number of ways which may or 
affect the ability of the organization to meet performance goals. 
Figure 1 displays an overarching conceptual model of organizational decision 
making as applied to institutions of higher education.  While this dissertation will focus 
primarily on the linkages between managerial values, decision making, and 
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organizational performance, it is nevertheless important to understand the full scope of 
the environment in which an organization operates. 
Figure 1: Factors that Effect Organizational Decision Making and Performance in U.S. Higher Education 
Institutional Dependencies 
The ability of organizations to adapt to changing environments has been a 
consistent interest of scholars studying both public organizations and private firms 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985, Leslie and Slaughter 1997).  In 
order to adapt to change, organizations participate in repeated interactions with their 
surrounding environment on a day-to-day basis, often seeking to acquire more capital.  
As part of these interactions, each organization has some degree of dependency on the 
environment for vital resources such as raw materials, profits, and personnel (Gornitzka 
1999).  Dependencies require that the strategic plans and actions of organizations are 
limited by changes in the demands of other groups that supply needed resources.  Even 
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the most stable organization must be able to react and adjust to changes in the 
environment in order to survive.  For public agencies, many resources are provided by 
policymakers.  The ability of policymakers to increase or decrease the level of 
provisions to public organizations can serve as a mechanism to control the agency.   
Altering budget allocations is often a central strategy for policymakers to ensure that 
public organizations implement the policy priorities preferred by legislatures and other 
policymakers. When capital provided by policymakers shifts, organizations must be 
creative in how they acquire new or additional resources while still meeting performance 
goals.  Whether agencies can continue to achieve performance goals while pursuing new 
resources in light of ongoing state and federal budget allocation, however, remains an 
important question across disciplines.  
For higher education, the balance between equity and efficiency could be 
challenged by the prioritization of budget stabilization over efforts to ensure equal 
educational opportunities for all student groups.  One of the most salient consequences 
of shifting dependencies has been the increase of tuition and fees; between 2002 and 
2012, tuition and fees at public four year institutions had an annual rate of growth of 5.2 
percent (inflation-adjusted dollars), higher than the growth in the two previous decades 
(College Board 2012).  Public two-year school were not far behind with an average 
growth rate of 3.9 percent  This may place great limitations on access to education for a 
number of minority groups who tend to be more highly concentrated in lower 
socioeconomic classes.  In addition to changing dependencies, institutions are often 
subject to performance funding policies that make current shifts in dependencies even 
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more undesirable.  Yet, while these policies may frame the decisions made by 
institutions to better a number of performance indicators, research has shown that these 
policies have not been a reliable tool for realizing performance improvements but could 
become useful in newer policies that attribute a larger portion of funding to performance 
outcomes. 
Institutional Structure 
Across both higher education and public administration literatures, scholars have 
shown that the structure of institutions matters for determining policy outcomes (Knott 
and Payne 2004, Lowry 2001, Van Ginkel 2001, Moe 1990).  Some states enforce highly 
centralized systems while others grant great autonomy to each institution.  These 
differences lead to variances in bureaucratic discretion (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 
Huber and Shipan 2002) that are likely to affect decision making processes and, 
subsequently, organizational performance.  Individual universities also vary widely in 
complexity and size, with some institutions offering a limited number of associate’s 
degrees while others boast over 400 undergraduate and graduate programs.  Likewise, 
the number of students may range from less than 500 to more than 50,000, presenting a 
wide range of additional management issues.  Many differences in these institutional 
missions may be detected in the selectivity of the institution, measured by the percentage 
of students admitted from the applicant pool.  Selectivity affects the goals of the 
institution and thus administrative decision making on curriculum, budgets, target 
student populations, and more.  For example, much research has shown that without 
affirmative action policies, a large share of African American students would attend less 
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selective institutions, which would have great implications for their future social 
opportunities (Arcidiacono 2006, Kane 1998). 
Administrative Values 
Managers each have values and beliefs that play a critical role in shaping 
managerial strategy and decision-making for organizations (Lowi 1979, Kettl 1993).  
Indeed, the role of values in shaping managerial behavior and organizational outcomes 
has been a prevalent discussion in public administration since at least the Friedrich-Finer 
debate on how to maintain democratic processes (Finer 1941, Frederich 1940).  This 
values discussion has also developed among theories of political control of the 
bureaucracy and assessments of the differences between politics and administration (for 
example, Goodsell 1983, Lowi 1979, Kettl 1993).  However, the ability of any branch of 
government to control bureaucratic actors can be quite limited and may also depend on 
the bureaucrat’s “inner check” (Dahl 1970).  This disconnect can be seen in explanations 
of goal conflict or adverse selection.  In fact, Meier and O’Toole (2006) argue that 
political control mechanisms are only successful when political officials get bureaucrats 
to act in a way that they would not have acted otherwise.  However, as information about 
values is rarely collected, empirically determining how values affect decisions related to 
strategic change can be somewhat challenging (for one exception pertinent to this 
research, see Rutherford and Meier 2014 on presidential goal setting).  
Institutional Decisions 
Public management literature has widely documented the importance of 
managers in public organizations.  Management includes motivating and coordinating 
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actors towards performance goals, leveraging inputs to achieve outputs, creating 
organization structures, and taking advantage of environmental changes to improve 
performance (O’Toole and Meier 1999). Decisions by administrators in institutions of 
higher education are highly salient, though research is mixed on whether these decisions 
have a direct effect on organizational performance (Cohen and March 1986).  Further, 
while administrators often invest time and energy in creating strategic plans (Bryson 
2004), little is known about whether and how these plans are implemented as well as 
whether the implementation of change is generally successful in improving 
organizational performance (see Poister, Pitts, and Edwards 2010; but see Poister et al. 
2013). 
Student Characteristics 
While environmental context and administrative decision making can both be 
connected to student performance in education, student characteristics are just as 
important for understanding differences in educational outcomes across student groups.  
Family income and social class, performance at the K-12 level, and peer effects among 
groups in an institution’s student body may lead to advantages or disadvantages in the 
ability of an individual student to enroll in and attend a university (Astin and Oseguera 
2005; Mortenson 1997; Scott, Bailey, and Kienzl 2006).  This line of research has found 
that student outcomes vary by gender as well as by race/ethnicity such that institutions 
with higher levels of women tend to have higher performance indicators while 
institutions with high concentrations of minority students tend to have lower rates of 
student success.  While the characteristics of the student profile of colleges and 
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universities will not be the central focus of this research, it is essential to recognize the 
importance of these characteristics and to control for them in models to ensure analyses 
are fully specified. 
Performance Feedback Loops 
While performance is the key dependent variable in this research, it also provides 
feedback information for administrators and their political principals (in other words, it 
is also an important independent variable in many models of decision making and 
performance).  This information has become increasingly salient among stakeholder 
groups who desire to hold public organizations accountable.  In reference to higher 
education policy, student outcomes such as graduation and retention rates provide 
information to state and institutional level policymakers.  At the state level, this 
information may influence the decision to implement performance budgeting or 
performance funding policies (Rabovsky 2012).  At the institutional level, administrators 
may use performance gaps as related to past performance or peer performance to 
determine priorities (Rutherford and Meier 2014). 
Because decisions can be expected to be partially determined by performance, 
this general model and associated specifications in the chapters that follow face the 
challenge of endogeneity.  This will be explicitly recognized in this research and will be 
addressed through models that include past performance and specification that help 
control for the autoregressive nature of these organizations. 
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1.3 Three Essays on Management in Higher Education 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether managerial differences 
lead to changes in decision making, strategic changes, and, ultimately, organizational 
performance.  While these questions may be studied in a number of ways, the three 
empirical chapters that follow provide an interesting assessment of current literature and 
provide many avenues for moving research in public management forward.  
The first empirical chapter, High Risk, High Reward? The Role of Managerial 
Fit in Organizational Performance, builds upon organizational-environmental fit 
literature to determine whether the fit between presidents’ former and current institutions 
has any effect on student performance, measured by graduation and retention rates as 
well as degree production.  Findings suggest that high levels of fit are not always good 
and that some level of misfit may actually contribute to increasing organizational 
performance.  This supports the notion that misfits can introduce new to organizations, 
which many be especially helpful in context of a changing external environment.  
Second, Where the Rubber Meets the Road: The Influence of Presidential 
Characteristics on Strategic Fiscal Change, focuses on whether presidents implement 
strategic change or manage incrementalism in revenues, expenditures, and pricing given 
the current demands of the external environment.  While strategic plans are normatively 
associated with more efficient management and are assumed to bolster performance, 
analyses in this essay shows that presidents of various backgrounds are rarely different 
from one another in a systematic way.  Instead, presidents are much more likely to 
follow paths of incremental change on average such that no single type of president, with 
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the potential exception of individuals with high h indices, acts differently than others in 
strategic decisions for the institution.   
The third essay, Reexamining Causes and Consequences: Does Administrative 
Intensity Matter for Organizational Performance?, explores the nonlinear determinants 
and effects of administrative intensity, a non-monetary phenomena often determined by 
presidents.  This study reasserts that the structure of an institution can drive 
administrative intensity but that administrative intensity can negatively affect student 
performance if it extends beyond a certain size of total employees.  In other words, some 
administrative intensity is helpful for managing the institution, but too much can take 
away resources from other areas of the organization. 
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2. HIGH RISK, HIGH REWARD? THE ROLE OF MANAGERIAL FIT IN
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
2.1 Overview 
The question of managerial fit—the congruence between a manager and her 
environment—has become widely debated by policymakers, practitioners, and scholars 
from a number of fields as the occurrence of hiring outsiders to lead public agencies has 
increased over time.  While many assume that higher levels of fit in an organization will 
generate better performance, others argue that misfits may be better suited at leading 
organizations as motivated change agents.  In this study, a measure of person-
organization fit is created using original cross-sectional time-series data on U.S. 
university presidents from 1993-2013.  Findings indicate that high levels of fit are not 
ideal and that fit has a nonlinear relationship with organizational performance such that 
some fit is healthy but high fit is detrimental for organizational performance. 
15 
 
2.2 Introduction 
Recent research in public administration has expanded large-N data in a manner 
that can more accurately pursue generalizations in management-performance questions 
across a number of contexts including cross-organizational and cross-national analyses 
(Akkerman and Torenvlied 2011, O’Toole and Meier 2014).  These studies commonly 
focus on how and when changes in principal-agent relationships or variance in 
management styles are able to have some degree of observed effect on autoregressive 
public agencies that are responsible for meeting multiple, competing performance goals 
(Chun and Rainey 2005; Walker, Boyne, and Brewer 2010).   The importance of 
developing a systematic, fully-specified model of organizational performance cannot be 
overemphasized, yet many questions about the ability of managers to influence 
performance have yet to be addressed.  Recent literature has given more attention to the 
theoretical effect of a manager’s background on performance (Petrovsky, James, and 
Boyne 2014), but little is known empirically about how the fit, or congruence, of 
managers in their organization can influence organizational performance.  
It is theoretically and substantively important to understand how a manager 
aligns with an organization because this congruence is likely to affect the ability of a 
manager to accurately assess what strategies will work best for the organization.  All 
managers are likely to strive to improve the organization, but differences in socialization 
and values will lead to divergence in decision making processes; the results of these 
decisions will then carry different implications for the organization such that some 
decisions are more appropriate than others for realizing performance gains.  If, as much 
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literature assumes, it is the case that a manager’s decisions and actions influence the 
performance of an organization, then understanding this causal story is an important 
discussion currently missing from the argument that “management matters” in 
organizations. 
This study provides three unique contributions to current literature.  First, the 
analyses presented here expand current fit theories from focusing on the alignment of 
subjective values to consider the importance of how socialization in previous roles can 
inform managers’ decisions in their current organizations.  This can help to avoid 
problems of common source bias (see Favero and Bullock 2014) that can arise when a 
manager is estimating both his own values and those of his organization.  Second, while 
much literature on fit centers on individual-level performance outcomes, there has been 
little discussion of the ability of managerial fit to influence overall organizational 
performance.  Theoretically, there should be some effect of managerial fit on overall 
performance because the fit of a manager will directly determine what plans are 
implemented in the organization in an effort to maintain or improve performance 
outputs.  Third, a new, large-N dataset capable of testing fit theories in the context of 
higher education in the United States is introduced to this line of research.  The market 
of higher education presents a strong test of fit theories because it includes organizations 
that widely vary along a number of structural and managerial dimensions but that are 
held responsible for similar performance outputs such that multiple congruence 
dimensions can be directly tested. 
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2.3 Person-Environment Research in Public and Private Sector Literature 
Person-environment fit can be broadly defined as the degree of overlap, or level 
of congruence, between the capabilities and values of a manager and her environment 
(Chatman 1989; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, and Johnson 2005).  Theories of fit 
originated in interactional psychology (e.g., Katz and Kahn 1978) but also have roots in 
earlier private sector literature regarding the match between individuals and broad 
sectors of work (what now take the form of personality tests and career assessments) 
(Parsons 1909, Lewin 1935).  Discussions of congruence among individuals and their 
surroundings have since been the source of much interest among management and 
behavioral scholars, generating hundreds of articles and thousands of citations.  
Theories of fit, however, have not developed without controversy.  Person-
environment fit (PE) as a general notion of the congruence between an individual and 
her surroundings is often said to be an umbrella for several other categories of 
managerial fit.  Within existing strands of literature, at least four domains of congruence 
related to person-environment interactions have been articulated—person-group, person-
supervisor, person-job, and person-organization (Kristof-Brown et al. 2005 provide a 
more detailed description of each of these types). As related to interactions with 
individuals, person-group (PG) fit focuses on the relationships between a manager and 
the entire team of individuals with whom the manager is expected to work (Judge and 
Ferris 1992, Riordan 2000).  Similarly, person-supervisor (PS) fit focuses explicitly on 
the relationship between an individual and her supervisor or between a supervisor and 
one or more subordinate employees (Adkins, Russell, and Werbel 1994; Van Vianen 
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2000).  Less dependent on the ability of individuals to cooperate, person-job (PJ) fit 
focuses on the pairing of the skills of an individual employee and the tasks required to 
perform a specific job.  This type of fit has often been described as a demands-abilities 
fit or as a needs-supplies fit (Edwards 1991).  In other words, the abilities of the 
individual must fulfill the demands of the job or, similarly, the skills an employee can 
supply to the organization must adequately address its needs.  Finally, and perhaps most 
important to this study, is person-organization fit (PO).  Research on PO fit focuses on 
the degree of congruence between an individual and the entire organization in terms of 
values, preferences, and goals (Tom 1971). 
Within public management literature, theories of fit have recently gained 
attention in discussions of public service motivation (PSM) (Bright 2007; Christensen 
and Wright 2011; Gould-Williams, Mostafa, and Bottomley 2013).  These studies have 
identified “PSM fit” as a specific type of congruence that may mediate the relationship 
between PSM and self-reported measures of individual performance, job choice, work 
attitudes, or performance information use.  These studies generally argue that the 
positive relationship between PSM and performance is strengthened when fit is taken 
into account. 
While applying theories of fit to the PSM literature is valuable for creating 
testable hypotheses that can expand current theories, fit should be applicable more 
broadly than PSM to additional aspects of management-performance relationships. 
Current management models commonly focus on how and when various actions of 
managers can affect performance (networking and buffering are two examples), but 
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these theories have often placed less emphasis on the importance of the socialization and 
training that a manager brings to an organization and whether these traits suit the needs 
of the organization (though see the consideration of managerial quality in Meier and 
O’Toole 2002).  Individuals may acquire managerial roles with an array of socialization 
experiences that will generate variance in decision making processes, even when two or 
more managers are operating under similar circumstances.  Analyzing the underlying 
drivers of this variance and determining how and when managerial fit relates to 
performance can allow for a more robust approach to identifying management-
performance linkages. 
2.4 Measuring Fit: Subjective and Objective Assessments 
Measuring a multifaceted concept such as fit has been perhaps one of the largest 
challenges of this line of research; the compatibility between an individual and their 
organization can be captured in many different ways.  Some have conceptualized 
perceived fit by directly asking individuals about their fit in an organization (Judge and 
Cable 1995).  More commonly, scholars concerned with capturing commensurate 
measures at the level of the individual and organization and who wish to measure 
objective fit have asked more indirect questions such as “What do you value?” and 
“What does your organization value?” or “How much do you get paid?” and “How much 
would you like to get paid?” (James et al. 1984, James et al. 1988).  Further, responses 
from individuals within a single organization are often compared to establish a level of 
sufficient consensus for organizational-level characteristics (though individual goals, 
values, and priorities are naturally assumed to vary).  For both direct and indirect 
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questions, some type of index is calculated by using algebraic (X-Y), absolute |(X-Y)|, or 
squared (X-Y)2 differences (Kristof 1996).   
 While these calculations include a number of problems (loss of information about 
directionality and weighting, for example) that have been debated in existing literature 
(Edwards 1993, Edwards and Harrison 1993), less concern has been raised over whether 
the objective measures of fit are really objective at all.  Defining organizational values 
based on individual responses, even while noting congruence among individuals in the 
same organization, limits research to organizations with a strong, unified culture and, 
more problematically, means that analyses are subject to common source bias.  Common 
source bias, a problem that has attracted much attention in recent public administration 
research (Meier and O’Toole 2013, Favero and Bullock 2014), occurs when two 
variables have similar measurement error.  Parallel errors are often the case when 
models use one or more answers from the same survey to measure different concepts.  
While some methods have been discussed to correct for this bias (Podsakoff et al. 2012), 
many solutions either fail to correct the root problem of related error structures or over 
correct such that results are still invalid (Richardson, Simmering, and Sturman 2009). 
 One way to address the problem of common bias in subjective measures of fit is 
to compare a manager’s current organization to her previous organization.  While goals 
and values cannot be measured directly in this type of comparison, similarly structured 
organizations are likely to encounter analogous challenges and should thus socialize 
managers in similar ways, especially if they are located within the same industry.  For 
example, a large hospital is likely to be more similar to another large hospital than a 
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small hospital; the large hospitals are likely to have more complex organizational 
structures and larger, more diverse pools of stakeholders as compared to the small 
hospital.  The same argument can be applied to other organizational characteristics such 
as diversity, administrative intensity, centralization, or clientele. 
 When organizational characteristics and structures are compared, indices like 
those in existing literature can be calculated to create a single measure of PO fit such 
that higher values indicate that a manager comes from a highly similar organization and 
is therefore trained and socialized to make strategic decisions that fit the organization.  
After reviewing hypotheses for relating fit to organizational performance, this type of 
structural fit will be operationalized and used for the analyses in this study. 
2.5 Connecting Fit to Organizational Performance 
 Dependent variables in current private sector fit literature are largely measured in 
terms of individual-level outcomes such as work attitudes, social behavior, and work 
performance (Schneider 1987; Tziner 1987; Vancouver, Millsap, and Peters 1994) but 
do not include the overall performance of the organization.  When organizational 
performance has been considered, only cautionary hypotheses have been postulated.  
Yet, following the notion that managers matter, fit should not only affect individual-
level outputs but should also affect organizational-level outputs.   
 Within public management research, the importance of PO fit has long been 
implied in a number of discussions of how managerial values shape organizational 
performance.  For instance, Boyne and Dahya (2002) and Hill (2005) illustrate the ways 
in which managerial motives, means, and opportunities are likely to shape performance.  
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Parallel literature on the differences between internal and external managers as well as 
career civil servants and political appointees (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Hamidullah, 
Wilkins, and Meier 2008; Lewis 2007) also reflects some concern for the ability of a 
new manager to sufficiently align with an organization in order to maintain or improve 
performance.  Further, the recent work of Petrovsky et al. (2014) provides one of the few 
explicit discussions of linkages between fit and organizational performance in current 
public management literature.  This study, related to managerial turnover, defines the 
term “publicness fit” as the comparison between the publicness of a manager’s 
experiences with the publicness of the organization.1  The authors provide some intuitive 
hypotheses that may be used in a more general notion of person-organization fit (in other 
words, we can measure congruence based on characteristics that include but are not 
limited to the publicness of the organization), but they do not provide an example of any 
dataset in which fit can be empirically assessed to confirm their propositions. 
 A large body of research on fit is based on the premise that positive outcomes 
will result from scenarios in which individuals match the current context and needs of an 
organization (O’Reilly, Chatman, and Caldwell 1991).  According to this line of thought, 
a high level of congruence between a manager and her organization should boost the 
ability of the manager to correctly assess and interpret the environment of the 
organization and should, therefore, be linked to appropriate decision making 
(Westerman and Vanka 2005, Morley 2007).  The implementation of these decisions 
                                                          
1 The authors define publicness through dimensions of public ownership, degree of public funding, and 
public regulation. 
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should boost, or at least maintain, organizational performance.  For instance, a manager 
from an organization with a homogenous clientele group may not be able to adapt to an 
organization with more diverse clientele if she simply transfers the same strategies from 
one organization to the other.  In other words, differences in environments (clientele, 
funding, hierarchical structure) of the two organizations may prohibit the translation of 
strategies and managerial skill from one organization to the next.  However, when a 
manager understands the constraints under which an organization operates (a move from 
a highly diverse organization to another highly diverse organization), she can select 
those strategies that are most applicable in order to maintain or improve performance. 
 However, it is also plausible that a high level of fit is undesirable and can have 
negative consequences for organizational performance.  Argyris (1957), for instance, 
argues that organizations with too many people of one type may lead the organization to 
become stagnant, ineffective, and less willing to experiment with innovation.  This 
proposition is largely related to the negative connotations that accompany concepts such 
as group think where too much consensus dampens healthy levels of conflict and 
innovation.  Walsh (1987) adds that managers with lower levels of congruence (i.e. 
misfits) may actually stimulate organizational development, which can be particularly 
useful should the organization be on the verge of decline or face a significant level of 
competition from other organizations.  More recently, Simmering et al. (2003) found that 
poor fit stimulated self-development and encouraged individuals to change their work 
environments for the better, and Voelpel et al. (2006) find that organizations situated in 
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highly volatile environments can benefit from hiring a misfit who is willing to innovate 
in order to adapt to external shifts. 
 Finally, it may also be possible that the relationship between fit and performance 
is not strictly linear.  Some fit may be helpful in understanding the context of the 
organization, but some degree of misfit may also bring new, innovative ideas to the 
organization.  This would produce an inverted-U with an ideal level of fit.  Should this 
hypothesis prove fruitful, determining the optimal level of fit will be important not only 
for scholars of organizations but also for practitioners making hiring decisions. 
2.6 Research Context: Higher Education in the United States 
 To determine whether fit helps or hinders organizational performance, a 
structural measure of PO fit is examined in the context of higher education in the United 
States.  Institutions of higher education provide a timely test of fit as this sector consists 
of a large variety of organizations that can be compared on the basis of consistent 
performance indicators but, at the same time, operate according to differing norms and 
structures.   
The recent shift to more competitive markets in higher education has been 
accompanied by an increase in regulation by state and the federal governments focused 
on accountability and efficiency (Zumeta 2001) as well as an environment characterized 
by tightening budgets and limited resources.  These changes challenge managers’ ability 
to balance goals of equity, accessibility, and affordability with accountability.  For 
example, colleges and universities have been pressured to both improve the affordability 
of degrees for all students while quantitatively illustrating that high quality of learning 
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occurs in their institution.  Presidents, caught in a quality-quantity conundrum, argue that 
it is costly to improve quality such that higher rates of performance for both goals cannot 
be achieved simultaneously.  In fact, many believe that access, affordability, and quality 
are positioned on an “iron triangle” in which a change to improve one axis will 
inevitably effect the others in a negative way (Rodriguez and Kelly 2014).  Institutions 
of higher education in the U.S. must continue to cope with these environmental changes 
in order to show that post-secondary degrees are necessary for individual social gains 
and state and national economic growth (Altbach, Gumport, and Berdahl 2011; 
Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). 
 As the policy landscape of higher education has shifted over the past thirty years, 
the expectations of managers in these organizations have greatly shifted.  Managers are 
pressured to seek additional sources of revenue while also becoming part-time 
politicians through interactions with state and federal actors who seek to decrease 
funding to higher education while holding the sector more accountable for meeting 
controversial performance goals (Tamburri 2007).  Attempting to meet these many 
demands, colleges and universities have hired presidents from a variety of backgrounds 
(while industry norms exist, no specific certification or training is required to be hired as 
a university president).  The majority of institutions hire a president or provost from 
within the higher education industry, but others have employed former lawyers, bankers, 
politicians, and military personnel to lead their institutions through times of change. 
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2.7 Data 
Data to test person-organization fit come from two sources.  First, public data on 
university presidents2 was collected from colleges and universities rated by the Carnegie 
classification system—a system used as the basis for the highly salient U.S. News 
rankings—as doctoral/research universities, research universities-high research activity, 
or research universities-very high research activity across a twenty-one year period 
(1993-2013).3  The universe of institutions within these classification includes 292 
public and private institutions.4  Data for 282 schools were coded for this study because 
ten schools did not provide over-time information on their president in a publicly 
accessible format.  Data were collected on length of managerial tenure, start and end 
dates of service, previous employment, educational background, and demographics (see 
summary in Table 1).  This data set was then merged with institutional data from the 
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) IPEDS Delta Cost Project.  These data 
are reported from universities to the NCES on an annual basis.  Variables, explained in 
detail below, include revenues and expenditures, staffing, and enrollment profiles, 
among other variables.   
  
                                                          
2 By president, I mean the individual who serves as the executive manager of a university campus, not the 
manager for a system with multiple campuses.  For example, data is coded for each University of 
California campus, not for the University of California system.  Note that some systems (Colorado, for 
example) use the term chancellor for executives at the institutional level and president for the system level.  
In this case, chancellors were coded as “presidents.”  
3 As university presidents are public figures, all data was collected from publicly available information on 
university websites. No surveys were conducted to collecte this data.  
4 Public and private institutions are not largely differentiated here.  In many cases, a public and private 
university may look more alike than two public universities due to organizational mission, size, and 
reputation. 
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Table 1: Profile of Presidents, 1993-2013     
Demographics 1993-2013 Percent 1993 Percent 2013 Percent 
Women 14.66 10.42 17.56 
Black 6.7 4.26 7.53 
Latino 2.51 1.55 3.23 
Interim 3.34 2.3 4.66 
Years of Experience 5.89 5.61 5.96 
Years since Bachelors 37.42 34.31 40.3 
Age 59.42 56.31 62.3 
Education       
Has JD 11.69 10.16 13.26 
Has MD 2.97 2.35 3.94 
Has PhD 84.14 87.5 82.01 
Top PhD fields    
  social sciences 22.18 22.23 26.66 
  Humanities 19.73 20.37 12.00 
  Education 12.85 13.89 15.11 
  Engineering 12.02 12.5 12.44 
Prior Position Overall       
Prior Internal 28.12 23.23 33.09 
Prior Other University 61.94 68.11 55.76 
Prior Private 3.82 3.54 3.96 
Prior Public (Non-HE) 6.08 5.06 6.81 
Prior Position in HE       
President 23.92 23.62 19.42 
VP/Provost 42.79 42.13 50.36 
Dean 14.48 14.96 14.39 
Professor 6.57 7.48 4.32 
Other 2.85 4.72 1.08 
Top producers of presidents    
  University of Washington 7 presidents   
  University of North Carolina 7 presidents   
  University of Michigan 7 presidents   
  University of New Mexico 6 presidents   
  University of Iowa 6 presidents     
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Dependent Variables 
 At the state and federal level, a number of factors have been used as indicators of 
institutional performance in terms of quality, accessibility, and affordability, among 
other goals.  For the present study, I focus on student performance because it is the focus 
of the majority of performance funding policies currently being implemented by states 
(Rabovsky 2012).  Among indicators of student performance, graduation and retention 
rates as well as degree production have been used most commonly to rate the 
performance of colleges and universities.  Degree production is measured as the number 
of degrees conferred per 100 full-time equivalent students and provides some indication 
of efficiency.  The standard conceptualization of an institution’s graduation rate is the 
percent of full-time first-time students who graduate within six years of enrollment.  
Somewhat related to graduation rates, an institution’s retention rates captures the percent 
of first-time full-time freshman who re-enroll for their second year of courses.  Each of 
these performance indicators is used in the analyses below to assess whether the 
relationship between fit and performance is consistent across multiple student-level 
outputs.  As these variables are available at different points in time (graduation and 
retention rates were not collected by IPEDS until the early 2000s), the number of 
institution-years will vary according to the dependent variable. 
Measuring Fit 
For each component of PO fit, the current organization of a manager was 
compared to her most recent organization along eight dimensions: total enrollment, the 
percent of black students, the percent Hispanic students, the percent of graduate students, 
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the percent of part-time students, sticker price tuition and fees, total revenue (logged), 
and revenue from private gifts, investment returns, and endowment earnings (logged).5   
Total student enrollment represents the mechanism through which colleges and 
universities have traditionally received funding from the state.  As enrollment is also an 
indicator of size and complexity, it should specify some of the demands on the university 
president in terms of the scope of issues that must be handled on a daily basis.  Diversity 
of the student body was also used to calculate fit for a variety of reasons.  Historically 
black colleges and universities (HBCUs) and Hispanic Serving Institutions (HSIs) often 
have specific institutional histories and missions that vary from other organizations to 
which they might be compared.  As such, a president’s responsibilities in these 
organizations is likely to include tasks that differ from the role of other presidents in this 
sample.  Further, diversity at any university may signal the degree to which access and 
equity are general goals of the organization (as compared to affordability, quality, or 
accountability).   
Additional enrollment status indicators were included to measure task 
complexity.  Higher levels of graduate students require a president to pay more attention 
to research initiatives while higher levels of part-time students will require more 
attention to retention and graduation efforts.  Both types of students will define, to some 
degree, how the president is expected to allocate her time and resources; these measures 
may also help to differentiate between research-intensive universities and regional 
                                                          
5 Geographic regions may also be related to how well a president is able to manage her institution, as 
culture norms and politics may shift.  However, coding for geography of the previous institution may not 
tap this dimension as the individual may be linked to a similar or different part of the country than where 
they were previously employed. 
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schools that offer but do not prioritize graduate education in the same way.  Next, 
controlling for price differences may be an important indicator of student quality and 
access.  As tuition and fees rise, more students will struggle to finish their degree, which 
can affect organizational performance.  However, higher levels of tuition may also raise 
the quality of students, as only those willing to pay and graduate will select to attend 
such an institution.   
Finally, including total revenue and revenue from private sources as components 
of fit provides a way to determine whether the president will be expected to spend more 
or less of her time looking for new resources.  For example, Ivy League schools are 
likely to care less about finding new revenue streams than determining how to maximize 
and manage the revenue streams they already possess.  Regional schools, on the other 
hand, must give more attention to raising money from alumni and securing research 
grants to ensure that the organization will remain competitive in the larger market. 
The calculation of each component of fit follows four steps that are largely 
similar to previous private sector research (Kristof 2006).  First, the value of each 
characteristic for the former organization was subtracted from that of the current 
institution to create a difference measure.  Second, the absolute value of each difference 
was calculated so that all distances were positive.  Next, each difference was adjusted to 
a 0-1 scale by subtracting the minimum value from each absolute value and then 
dividing by the maximum absolute value.  This rescaling allows all characteristics to be 
compared in a similar manner where no single component is weighted more or less than 
others.  These values were then reverse coded so that higher values signal high fit while 
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lower values translate to low fit.  Finally, to create a single congruence measure, each of 
the fit components were added together.6  As there were eight individual components, 
the final variable can theoretically range from a value of 0 to 8.   
Because the performance of a president’s prior institution is linked to clear 
directional hypotheses (e.g., that a president coming from a higher performing school 
should signal high quality management and have some ability to improve organizational 
outputs), prior performance is included as a separate variable and is not part of the PO fit 
index.  Here, prior performance is assessed by controlling for the absolute level of 
performance, defined as degree production, graduation rate, or retention rate as 
appropriate, in the president’s prior institution from the year prior to her transition.  If a 
president’s first year at her current institution was 2005, for example, the prior 
institution’s performance in 2004 will be included in the model.   
Three types of presidents were excluded from the main analysis below.  First, 
interim presidents are excluded because they are largely tasked with maintaining the 
institutional until a new president is hired; they generally are not expected to 
substantively change either the institution’s strategies or performance outcomes.  
Second, internal hires are excluded from organizational fit models to keep this 
population from unintendedly biasing the direction or significance of fit.7  Finally, 
                                                          
6 A measure closer to a Euclidean distance was also created in which the squared values of each fit 
component were added together, and the square root was taken of the sum.  This did not produce 
substantially different results. 
7 It is plausible in this study to assume that individuals promoted internally have the highest level of 
congruence with the organization, as they have already gained some awareness of the organization’s needs 
as well as additional constraints that may be in the environment.  Table 15 in the Appendix contains 
organizational fit models that incorporate this assumption.  For these models, internal hires received a 
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presidents who were hired by a university from outside of higher education (fifty five 
individuals in this sample were hired either from the private sector or a public agency) 
are not included in the organizational fit analyses.  These individuals theoretically may 
be coded as absolute misfits (a value of 0), but this assumption may not always hold.  
Some private organizations may socialize managers to understand institutions of higher 
education better than others, and performance is not easily comparable across these 
institutions.  For example, an individual who previously served as a four star general 
may align with the goals of a university differently than a former lieutenant governor or 
a state superintendent of K-12 education.8   
 Summary statistics of the key variables and all controls are displayed in Table 2.  
Despite having a large range of values, it is clear that the average fit of university 
presidents in this sample of institutions is quite high.  The presence of high levels of fit 
may be due to the decision to focus solely on one type of university (four year, doctoral 
and research universities).  Even so, this provides some descriptive evidence that 
organizations generally prescribe to the notion that higher levels of fit will be better for 
the organization.    
  
                                                          
maximum value of 8 for the summative fit index.  As shown below, findings with or without the inclusion 
of the internal hires are consistent. 
8 Appendix Table 16 offers some evaluation of presidents hired from outside of higher education.  In 
Models 1, 3, and 5, bivariate measures capture whether an individual was hired from a public agency or a 
private firm.  In these models, individuals from public agencies actually appear to do worse than those 
hired from within the higher education industry while those from private firms do slightly better, though 
coefficients do not reach a suitable level of significance.  Models 2, 4, and 6 take a slightly different 
approach, measuring outside hires as coming from agencies or firms that are related to education broadly.  
Again, while no results reach significance, those with some type of linkage to education tend to do better 
than their peers. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Person-Organization Fit in Higher Education  
  Mean SD Min Max 
Fit Characteristics     
Organizational Fit (summation) 7.193 .464 5.826 7.796 
Performance and Decision making     
Prior University Performance, Degrees 26.631 7.643 0.228 105.952 
Prior University Performance, Graduation 65.985 18.289 15.917 97.926 
Prior University Performance, Retention 84.117 11.152 0 100 
Change in President 0.102 0.302 0 1 
President Experience 6.015 5.444 0 34 
Institutional Level Control Variables     
Percent Black Students 9.972 15.751 0 98.103 
Percent Hispanic Students 5.319 7.241 0 63.496 
Instructional Spending/FTE Student 
(logged) 9.188 0.598 2.035 11.637 
Sticker Price Tuition and Fees (logged) 8.878 0.903 6.122 10.629 
Percent Undergraduate Students 70.251 15.134 0.531 96.064 
Enrollment (logged) 9.517 0.891 4.828 12.25 
Percent Part-time Students 25.7 14.297 0.076 91.696 
Percent Part-time Faculty 20.317 17.878 0 97.561 
State-Level Control Variables     
State Performance Funding Policy  0.189 0.392 0 1 
State Appropriations (Constant 2009 
dollars, millions) 1639.238 1363.182 52.327 6315.971 
State Unemployment Rate 5.803 1.952 2.267 17.733 
 
 
Control Variables 
For the purposes of this study, control variables are focused primarily on the 
level of the institution.  From data collected on presidents, variables are included for a 
change in management (first year of a president) and a president’s years of experience at 
the institution to test for short or long-term effects on performance over the course of 
presidents’ acculturation to the institution.  I account for the student enrollment profile at 
each institution by including measures of student diversity (percent black students, 
percent Hispanic students).  Next, I include several institutional characteristics.  Total 
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student enrollment (logged) captures institutional size and represents the traditional 
mechanism though which colleges and universities have often received funding from 
state policymakers.  I control for student access through logged in-state tuition and fees 
(“sticker price”), and overall resources to students through a logged measure of the 
instructional spending per full-time student.  Task difficulty is measured through the 
percent of undergraduate students, the percent of part-time students, and the percent of 
part-time faculty at the institution; all should be negatively correlated with performance.9 
 To capture state-level variance, I control for the presence of a performance-
funding policy, state appropriations for higher education in millions (held constant at 
2009 dollars), and the state unemployment rate.  Performance-funding policies are 
largely touted by policymakers as a mechanism by which universities will improve 
student performance (though this is not always empirically supported; see Rutherford 
and Rabovsky 2014).  Controlling for the presence of this policy may also capture the 
attention given to the accountability of higher education in the state.  Appropriations are 
a measure of resources, and unemployment rates may measure competition for higher 
education funding (in times of lean economic years, less money is generally given to 
higher education while more funding is focused on welfare programs).  To control for 
drifts in performance over time, I include year fixed effects.  Thus, neither time (year) 
nor place (state) should substantially alter or threaten the validity of the findings below.  
Further, when dealing with time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data for highly 
                                                          
9 A control for whether the organization has a hospital was also tested in these models.  However, as this 
variable lowered the number of cases in the sample and was not significant, this variable was not included 
in final models. 
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autoregressive organizations, it is also essential that scholars be cognizant of problems 
such as serial autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.  Following prescriptions for the use 
of panel data, all models are general least squares estimates with clustered errors and 
lagged dependent variables.10   
2.8 Findings 
 Table 3 includes tests of organizational fit as applied to degrees per 100 full-time 
equivalent students, graduation rates, and retention rates.  Fit variables are significant 
above and beyond the highly significant lagged dependent variables.  In Models 1, 3, and 
5, fit has a negative relationship with performance, though only in the case of degree 
production is the coefficient significant.  More importantly, across all dependent 
variables, models generate support for the notion that fit has a nonlinear relationship 
with performance (though this relationship fails just short of significance in Model 2).  
Models 2, 4, and 6 produce turning points of 6.602, 6.812, and 6.706, respectively.  As 
the average value of fit in this sample is just over 7, the turning point occurs rather 
quickly.  This implies that hiring a president who would be considered moderate to high, 
but not extreme, misfit to manage the institution can boost performance, perhaps through 
the introduction of new ideas and strategies or new socialization and norms among mid 
and lower level employees (this dataset does not allow further investigation of this 
relationship at the micro-level). 
                                                          
10 Models with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and panel-specific corrections for AR1 
autocorrelations were also tested and found to produce parallel results. 
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 Interestingly, while higher levels of performance in a president’s previous 
organization were expected to boost performance in the current organization (as a proxy 
for the ability of a manager to be associated with ideas and strategies that work), this 
only appears to matter in the case of retention rates.  It may be that adapting knowledge 
from one organization to another is complex and difficult to achieve.  In terms of 
additional control variables for the president, mixed support is provided for managerial 
experience, and no relationship is detected for presidential turnover.  This may be due to 
the highly autoregressive nature of these organizations.  Among institutional structures, 
instructional expenditures help performance while higher tuition costs are positively 
associated with degree efficiency and size tends to be positively related with graduation 
and retention rates. 
Robustness Checks 
 Several additional tests were conducted on this data to determine whether the 
nonlinear and largely negative relationship between fit and organizational performance 
was robust.  First, the experience of the past president was added to the model and was 
interacted with fit, as we might expect that the longer the prior president serves, the 
longer her legacy will last in the organization (making it harder to change in future 
years).  Unsurprisingly, in the case where the prior president was in power for more than 
ten years (this occurs in approximately 1 of 3 cases in the sample), the effect of fit on 
performance dissipates.   
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Table 3: The Effect of Person-Organization Fit on Student Performance 
  
Degrees/100 FTE 
Students 150% Graduation Rate FTFT Retention Rate 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Organizational Fit -0.2000+ 4.0882 -0.1461 10.0334+ -0.6785 20.4825+ 
  (0.1158) (2.7452) (0.2087) (5.3476) (0.4524) (12.4647) 
Organizational Fit2  -0.3096  -0.7364+  -1.5271+ 
   (0.1977)  (0.3903)  (0.9014) 
Prior Organization Performance (Degrees) 0.0016 0.0024      
  (0.0130) (0.0131)      
Prior Organization Performance (Grad)   0.0095 0.0089    
    (0.0068) (0.0065)    
Prior Organization Performance (Ret)     0.0502* 0.0499* 
      (0.0231) (0.0217) 
Change in President 0.1156 0.1185 0.0409 0.0464 0.3238 0.3876 
  (0.2176) (0.2177) (0.4191) (0.4162) (0.7119) (0.7124) 
President Experience (years) 0.0238 0.0242 0.1092* 0.1136* 0.0334 0.0457 
  (0.0191) (0.0193) (0.0374) (0.0368) (0.0412) (0.0422) 
Percent Black Students -0.0092+ -0.0090+ -0.0191+ -0.0201+ -0.0119 -0.0132 
  (0.0051) (0.0049) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0174) (0.0174) 
Percent Hispanic Students 0.0012 0.0000 -0.0344 -0.0351 -0.0153 -0.0178 
  (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0369) (0.0382) (0.0455) (0.0451) 
Percent Part-time Students 0.0156* 0.0141* -0.1129* -0.1223* -0.1425* -0.1563* 
  (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0251) (0.0269) (0.0530) (0.0570) 
Instructional Expenditures/FTE Student (log) 0.6284* 0.6479* 0.5558+ 0.6282* 2.0148* 2.1162* 
  (0.1633) (0.1652) (0.2886) (0.3018) (0.7184) (0.7250) 
Sticker Price Tuition and Fees (logged) 0.3329* 0.3206* 0.4176 0.3859 0.5671 0.4581 
  (0.1248) (0.1239) (0.2732) (0.2602) (0.4365) (0.4229) 
       
38 
 
Table 3 Continued       
       
Enrollment (log) -0.0876 -0.0819 0.7099* 0.7126* 1.1296* 1.1164* 
  (0.0966) (0.0972) (0.2033) (0.2019) (0.4460) (0.4435) 
Percent Part-time Faculty 0.0043 0.0043 0.0008 0.0005 0.0291+ 0.0273+ 
  (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0084) (0.0081) (0.0160) (0.0157) 
State Performance Funding Policy  -0.2895* -0.2949* -0.0798 -0.1067 -0.1906 -0.2555 
  (0.1218) (0.1231) (0.2370) (0.2347) (0.4940) (0.4991) 
State Appropriations (Constant 2009 dollars, 
millions) 0.0001+ 0.0001+ 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
State Unemployment Rate -0.0262 -0.0374 -0.1637+ -0.1801* -0.0061 -0.0264 
  (0.0548) (0.0545) (0.0927) (0.0913) (0.1477) (0.1476) 
Lagged DV 0.8155* 0.8132* 0.8978* 0.8938* 0.6750* 0.6661* 
  (0.0350) (0.0351) (0.0238) (0.0245) (0.1051) (0.1070) 
Constant -1.2943 -16.0628+ -5.5961 -40.3816* -6.0717 -77.5049+ 
  (1.8829) (9.6755) (4.0314) (19.5701) (7.9695) (42.7840) 
Year FE 1994-2009 1994-2009 2003-2009 2003-2009 2005-2009 2005-2009 
N 1229 1229 623 623 400 400 
R2 .85 .85 .95 .95 .91 .91 
Chi2 7149.853 6943.872 54957.201 58235.881 3484.168 4222.140 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05       
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 Second, it might be that fit only matters for the first few years of a president’s 
term.  In other words, after some number of years, the president is socialized and seen as 
an integral part of the organization regardless of past experiences.  Thus, the sample was 
truncated by years of experience as president to see if some breaking point emerged that 
changed the negative relationships detected in the models presented above.  For 
example, models were conducted for presidents that had less than 2 years of experience, 
less than three years of experience, and so on.  The relationship between fit and 
performance become significant at year six.  As this is the average tenure of university 
presidents, most presidents were leaving their institution by the time that fit was no 
longer connected to performance. 
 Finally, a control was added for the total number of presidents each institution 
had over the twenty year period in this dataset.  A greater number of presidents might 
indicate some type of volatility that would prevent presidents from improving 
performance with any ease.  However, this variable was insignificant and did not explain 
any additional variance in models. 
2.9 Implications 
 This study attempts to measure a general, objective concept of fit through a 
public management perspective.  Findings indicate that while some low level of fit is 
needed, high fit can have negative consequences for organizational performance.  This 
would imply that organizations might be better off hiring managers from outside of their 
own institution.  These individuals may indeed bring new ideas to the institution that can 
be effective in improving performance. Those hired from the inside may be less likely to 
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challenge current norms such that the organization does not keep up with the changing 
demands of the environment in which it operates (Hill 2005).  In other words, the 
organization may become stagnant and unable to maintain student performance.  It 
should, of course, be noted that fit is not necessarily bad for all managers across all 
policy arenas, but findings from this sample of organizations certainly suggest that some 
distance is a good thing. 
While this research contributes the questions of fit in organizations, it does not 
come without notable limitations that require additional research.  The importance of 
specific components of fit may be under or over specified and may change in relative 
importance over time.  In other words, components of fit might be weighted differently 
by individual hiring committees even though they are given equal weight in this 
analysis.  The question of which aspects of fit matter most is likely to have important 
practical and theoretical implications for principal-agent relations and the ability of 
managers to oversee their organizations. Further, the direction of fit, only considered 
here for performance of the previous institution, is also likely to matter, though it is 
unclear currently what theoretical expectations should exist here.  For example, is there a 
difference between transitioning from a small to large school compared to leaving a 
large school for a small school?  Do adjustments in different directions have the same 
effects on organizational performance?  Further, while this study has focused on absolute 
levels of change between institutions, it may be the rate of change that matters.  For 
example, the rate of change of a president’s previous institution may affect how well he 
is able to influence both the rate of change and absolute level of performance at her 
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current institution.  This relationship may also depend on the rate of change at the 
current institution.  If the hiring institution is experiencing declining or increasing rates 
of change in performance, this trend may be difficult to change if the new president does 
not come with the skills needed to address this shift. 
Next, while organizational performance at the clientele-level is important for the 
accountability of the organization to many stakeholder groups, managers in this setting 
may be expected to influence other performance indicators such as revenues and 
expenditures, the ratio of administrators to front-line workers, or pricing strategies of the 
organization.  Fortunately, these questions can be investigated not only within the 
context of higher education but in other organizational settings such as health, welfare, 
and criminal justice. Context will matter significantly in determining both the causes and 
consequences of managerial fit in an organization.  While the case of higher education is 
certainly an interesting one, the generalizability of this context to other agencies 
certainly is limited. 
Even if findings in this research are specific to higher education, the theoretical 
questions are broadly generalizable to public and private organizations, non-profits, 
federal agency heads, and even elected officials if the right type of data are available.  
Tests of fit can be applied in each of these environments to determine what theoretical 
expectations hold across all contexts and what relationships may be more specific to 
certain types of organizations.  Fit should affect the ability of managers (broadly 
defined) in each of these settings and may have a variety of effects on priorities, decision 
making, and outcomes in the form of policy effects and client services.  While few 
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datasets that are capable of testing theories of fit are not common in public management, 
the construction of such datasets will have much value to future research. 
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3. WHERE THE RUBBER MEETS THE ROAD: THE INFLUENCE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS ON STRATEGIC FISCAL CHANGE  
 
3.1 Overview 
A general maxim of public organizations is that managers should engage in strategic 
planning and action. A review of the literature finds extensive examination of the 
determinants of strategic management but few studies on the link between strategic 
management processes and organizational outcomes.  Strategies are not self-
implementing, and managers need to make a variety of decisions to translate a strategic 
plan into action. This study uses a panel data base of U.S. universities to examine 
whether or not university presidents seek to change the attainment and use of 
institutional resources.  That few managerial characteristics can predict strategy indicates 
a lack of large scope strategic planning in higher education. 
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3.2 Introduction 
A general maxim of public organizations is that managers should engage in 
strategic planning and action.  Although the literature contains work that outlines basic 
strategies (e.g., Miles and Snow 1974) and has elaborate prescriptive work on how to 
engage in strategic planning (Bryson 2004), there has been little work on the 
implementation of strategic management.  The general perception in the world of 
practice is that strategic plans are placed on a shelf to gather dust until the next round of 
strategic planning.  A recent review of the literature finds extensive examination of the 
determinants of strategic management, but few studies on the link between strategic 
management processes and organizational outcomes (Poister et al. 2010; but see Poister 
et al. 2013 and private management literature such as Boeker 1997).  Even those studies 
that link specific organizational strategies to organizational outcomes (Boyne and 
Walker 2004, Meier et al. 2007), take strategy as indicated by managers as a given but 
do not determine if specific decisions are made to implement the strategy.  Strategies are 
not self-implementing, and managers need to make a variety of decisions to translate a 
strategic plan into action.  As such, subjective judgments made by managers are central 
to the implementation of strategic changes.  
This study uses a panel database of four year U.S. universities to examine 
whether or not different types of university presidents seek to change the fiscal 
characteristics (revenues, expenditures, pricing) of their institutions.  Fiscal changes can 
be directly controlled by university presidents, are often the first step in the 
implementation of strategic plans, and are indirectly connected to variation in 
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performance outcomes in future time periods.  Further, monetary actions to change the 
organization are a necessary condition for implementing a strategic plan.  An absence of 
noticeable changes in the analyses in this study suggests that decisions are incremental, 
at best, and cannot be linked definitively to characteristics (experience, expertise, new 
appointee) of a college or university president. 
The remaining sections first review literature on strategic stances, planning, and 
change through the lens of public administration research.  The importance of managers 
and managerial characteristics in the development and implementation of strategic 
change is proposed as a puzzle that has not been adequately addressed by current 
theories of change in public organizations.  The importance of strategic change in higher 
education is reviewed and then tested with an original cross-sectional times-series 
dataset on presidents in four year public colleges and universities. 
3.3 Purpose of Strategic Plans and Changes 
 A large share of recent research in public administration relies on the 
fundamental assumption that more effective (better) management will lead to higher 
levels of performance in public organizations.  This assumption provides a foundation 
for general management models that have produced a wide variety of studies connecting 
management and performance in multiple countries and organizational contexts (for 
example, Akkerman and Torenvlied 2009; Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001; Avellaneda 
2009; Andrews, Boyne, and Enticott 2006).  Alongside the persistent concern with 
generating a general theory of public management to predict organizational performance, 
scholars have also become interested in understanding the development and 
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implementation of strategic changes and the effect that strategy and change has on 
organizational processes and outcomes (Boyne 2001, Bryson 2004, Bryson et al. 2009, 
Nutt and Backoff 1993, Poister et al. 2010).   
Strategic plans and changes can provide clarity concerning the overall goals of 
the organization.  These plans are especially important for organizations to maintain 
long-term viability in the context of constantly changing environments that produce 
some level of uncertainty and instability.  In these environments, strategic changes help 
to set precedents and define institutional norms.  Further, many strategies can be updated 
according to shifting internal and external pressures and the availability of new 
information.  Existing literature, often in the context of UK local governments or Texas 
schools, has explored general categories of strategic stances following the typology 
introduced by Miles and Snow (Boyne and Walker 2004, Meier et al. 2007, Meier and 
O’Toole 2008, Walker et al. 2010).  This line of research has consistently found that 
prospectors are related to higher levels of performance as these organizations are 
inclined to be proactive in defining and implementing mechanisms by which to improve 
performance.  Reactors, on the other hand, are generally linked to lower levels of 
performance; these institutions essentially lack strategic plans or changes that allow the 
organization to keep up with shocks in the larger environment.   
While this research has contributed to theoretical advancements in public 
administration, these broad stances do not consider the details of strategies.  Instead, 
questions related to how strategies are formed and implemented is largely ignored.  
Research focused on a more micro-level approach to strategic planning has presented 
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two competing hypotheses.  On the one hand, advocates provide a number of reasons 
why strategic planning—tactics to address SWOT analyses, performance gaps, and 
environmental uncertainty—should theoretically have a positive effect on organizations 
(Olsen and Eadie 1982, Bryson and Roering 1987, Bryson 2004).  This view follows the 
classic notion that rational planning and coordination should improve performance.  
Planning has been conceptually linked to unifying complex organizations, maintaining 
competitiveness in a market setting, reducing uncertainty following environmental 
shocks, and socializing employees to specific norms and actions (Boyne 2001, Lathan 
2004, Poister 2010), though many of these hypotheses have not been directly tested in 
public administration literature.  One the other hand, a number of existing studies 
suggest that strategic planning does not work for a number of reasons.  For example, 
while the assumption that strategic planning should work has some surface level validity 
in theoretical terms, real world challenges increase the likelihood that strategic changes 
will fail.  In other words, an array of structures, norms, and attitudes have to be in place 
for strategies to work as intended (Bryson and Roering 1989).  Additionally, if managers 
or front-line employees are resistant to change, then planning is likely to go awry or be 
ignored (Tushman and Romanelli 1985).  Next, plans may be created with a one-size-
fits-all mentality such that strategic changes do not fit the context of the organization 
well.  The case of performance accountability reforms are a prime example of this type 
of strategic planning fault; a growing body of research has shown that accountability 
mechanisms that are not adjusted to the context of an organization may, at best, be 
ineffective and, at worst, be connected to a host of unintended consequences (Heinrich 
48 
 
2007, Radin 2006).  Finally, many studies on strategic planning and strategic change 
have treated strategy as a fixed object when it is not (Mintzberg 1978).  Strategy is a 
fluid process that can be influenced by a number of factors in the internal and external 
environment of the organization.  Because plans can be updated as more information 
becomes available, it is difficult to fully assess whether strategies can be related to 
statistically significant improvements in the organization. 
Aside from assessing whether strategic planning improves an organization, 
research has sometimes questioned whether managers actively pursue strategic change at 
all (Wildavsky 1973, Mintzberg 1993).  It may be that managers do not pursue larger 
strategic changes but, instead, make incremental changes to the system with hopes of 
producing some type of improvement to the organization.  For example, as the result of 
conducting a series of interviews with managerial executives, Quinn (1978, 1982) argues 
that organizational strategies are rarely written down and disseminated through an 
organization but are simply produced through fragmented, intuitive decision making 
processes.  Quinn contends that this “logical incrementalism” does not consist of 
muddling through but is a purposeful way to integrate the behavioral aspects of 
planning.  Perhaps most recently, arguments by Quinn and Wildavsky have been 
expanded by Baumgartner, Jones, and colleagues who seek to provide a better 
understanding of the limits of incrementalism through punctuated equilibrium theory 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1991, Jones and Baumgartner 2005a).  Among other findings, 
this line of research suggests that managers partake in both strategic changes and 
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incremental decision making processes at different points in time (Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005b).  
Research on both strategic planning and incrementalism has contributed to the 
expansion of multiple streams of research but contains many notable limitations.  First, 
while public administration research continues to discuss the impact of strategy 
formation on organizational performance (Boyne 2001, Bryson 2004, Niven 2003, Nutt 
and Backoff 1992), few have examined the implementation of strategic plans in 
organizations (but see Govindarajan 1989 and Boeker 1997 on private firm strategies).  
Recent studies in the context of UK local governments (Andrews et al. 2009, Walker et 
al. 2010) and U.S. transit agencies (Poister et al. 2013) have tested links between formal 
planning and incrementalism with performance, but neither of these cases has looked at 
what drives the decision to pursue certain strategies.  Further, empirical tests using large-
N datasets are still lacking in research related to strategic change. Case studies and 
small-n data do not allow for generalizability across time or space.  Second, it is 
important that scholars integrate the human side of strategic change into this line of 
research; top managers and the values they hold are key to understanding strategies.  In 
other words, strategic changes are decisions and actions created and implemented by real 
people.  By focusing on managers and the values that shape their decision processes, we 
can more precisely develop models that can explain the antecedents of strategy and 
change. 
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3.4 Connecting Managers to Strategic Change 
Strategic change is primarily a function of the executive in an organization.11  
Managers each have values and beliefs that play a critical role in shaping managerial 
strategy and decision-making for organizations (Lowi 1979, Kettl 1993).  Indeed, the 
role of values in shaping managerial behavior and organizational outcomes has been a 
prevalent discussion in public administration since at least the Friedrich-Finer debate on 
how to maintain democratic processes (Finer 1941, Frederich 1940).  This values 
discussion has also developed among theories of political control of the bureaucracy and 
assessments of the differences between politics and administration (for example, 
Goodsell 1983, Lowi 1979, Kettl 1993).  However, the ability of any branch of 
government to control bureaucratic actors can be quite limited and may also depend on 
the bureaucrat’s “inner check” (Dahl 1970).  This disconnect can be seen in explanations 
of goal conflict or adverse selection.  In fact, Meier and O’Toole (2006) argue that 
political control mechanisms are only successful when political officials get bureaucrats 
to act in a way that they would not have acted otherwise.  However, as information about 
values is rarely collected, empirically determining how values affect decisions related to 
strategic change can be somewhat challenging.   
To study managerial values, hypotheses and empirical models in this study 
follow the assumptions made by upper echelons theory.  Developed by Hambrick and 
Mason (1984), upper echelons theory argues that top managers make decisions and 
                                                          
11 In many public organizations, policymakers or other political principals may also play a role in 
developing organizational strategies. However, the executive of the organization is still tasked with the 
implementation of strategies and may have some level of autonomy in terms of how and when to 
implement changes. 
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implement actions according to their individual perceptions of the strategic opportunities 
and challenges they face and that the individual perceptions of managers are created 
through their experiences, values, and socialization.  Proponents of this theory argue that 
the demographic characteristics of managers, while imperfect and sometimes blunt 
measures, can be used as valid proxies to measure an individual’s underlying goals and 
values.  Characteristics considered here include managerial turnover, internal and 
external hires, managerial experience, and socialization.   
First, change in the executive of an organization may help to overcome inertia so 
that strategic plans are implemented at higher rates. Much of the discussion on 
managerial turnover and strategic change has been applied in the context of private firms 
(Brickley 2003, Furtado and Karan 1990); boards of directors and policymakers use 
reorganization and replacement as an opportunity to advance a corporation (Daily 1995). 
Research on public organizations generally assume that turnover is an indication of 
ineffective leadership and that a new manager may be able to transform the organization 
in order to improve outcomes (Hill 2005, Wright and Pandey 2010; Andrews, Boyne, 
and Walker 2011). In other words, a new manager can bring with her a new perspective 
that can revitalize performance through innovation and change.   
H1: Executive management turnover will increase the implementation of strategic 
change. 
 Existing literature has also found experience (tenure) to have important 
implications for managerial decision making. On the one hand, a longer tenure can allow 
a manager more time to stabilize the organization and establish strategic networks 
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(Jeunke 2005). Additionally, tenured managers are more likely to successfully resist 
external pressures and threats to the organization (Meyer 1975). While the momentum of 
the organization can overwhelm new managers, those with longer tenure can be more 
capable of enacting change within an organization (Hill 2005).12 Over time, a longer 
serving manager is able to better influence the organization due to established 
relationships and understanding of the organization (Miller 1991). 
 H2A: Longer managerial tenure will be associated with higher levels of strategic 
change.  
However, another line of research suggests that longer tenure in top-level 
management means that executives are more insulated and will be more cautious about 
deviating from current strategies (Goodstein and Boeker 1991).  In other words, 
managerial experience is often linked to higher levels of rigidity and the maintenance of 
established practices (Katz 1982).  An executive may process information differently 
(i.e. more selectively) from less experienced managers which may translate into missed 
opportunities to adjust to changes in the external environment in order to maintain long-
term viability. 
 H2B: Longer managerial tenure will be associated with lower levels of strategic 
change.  
Next, managerial perceptions and cost-benefit analyses that determine strategies 
are likely to vary by whether a manager is promoted from inside or hired from outside of 
                                                          
12 Though not tested here, it is possible that a long serving leader may become resistant to change, 
resulting in a decline in performance. This may point to a nonlinear relationship between managerial 
experience and performance. 
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the organization. An inside hire may be socialized to understand the environment of the 
organization in a way that aligns with the norms of the organization.  These internal 
hires are more likely to conform to existing values and norms which may subsequently 
lead to decisions that support the status quo (Kanter 1977, Wiersema 1992).  Further, 
inside hires may have less knowledge of strategies that have been successful in other 
agencies, which may increase uncertainty about pursuing new changes.  Conversely, 
external hires are less familiar with the norms of the organization and may be more 
likely to pursue strategic changes according to their different perspectives of the needs of 
the organizations.   
H3: Managers hired from outside the organization will pursue higher levels of 
strategic change. 
 
Finally, the socialization of a manager to a specific industry (as opposed to a 
specific organization) may affect her cost-benefit assessments, which will lead to 
different approaches in defining organizational strategies (and thus organizational 
performance). Socialization is defined here as the process by which an organization’s 
context, culture and norms shape a manager’s individual values and expectations. In 
other words, while different managers may want to achieve the same end result (a better 
organization with higher levels of performance), managers may have different means by 
which to achieve these goals following the norms to which they are accustomed. A 
manager’s experience within a certain organizational environment is likely to guide her 
evaluations of the context of the organization (Berlew and Hall 1966; Louis 1980). 
Ultimately, the professional norms associated with a certain industry can lead to 
different approaches in policy implementation (Teodoro 2014).  
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H4: Higher levels of socialization to the industry will lead to higher levels of 
strategic change. 
 
3.5 Strategic Change in the Context of Higher Education 
The analysis below focuses on the effect of university presidents on fiscal 
strategies in four year public colleges and universities.  Data to test the influence of 
managerial executives on strategic change come from three sources.  First, data on 
university presidents13 was collected from public U.S. colleges and universities rated by 
the Carnegie classification system as doctoral/research universities, research 
universities-high research activity, or research universities-very high research activity; 
data reported here spans the time period of 1993-2010.  The universe of these 
classifications consists of 175 institutions, though data for 155 schools were coded 
(twenty schools do not provide over-time information on their president in a publicly 
accessible format).  Data were collected on length of managerial tenure, start and end 
dates of service, previous employment, educational background, and demographics.14  
This dataset was then merged with h-indices for each university president from the 
Publish or Perish program that analyzes academic citations through Google Scholar and 
a series of metrics.15  The h-index is based on both the number publications an individual 
has produced as well as the number of citation these publications have received.  Finally, 
individual-level data was merged with institutional data from the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES) IPEDS Delta Cost Project.  Virtually all public, private 
                                                          
13 All data was collected from publicly available websites.  
14 It should be noted that not all 21 years could be coded for each of the colleges/universities due to the 
occasionally lack of information provided by the institution.  
15 See Harzing (2007) for more details on metrics and measures. 
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non-profit, and private for profit colleges and universities in the United States are 
required to report data on a yearly basis in exchange for the receipt of federal funding 
(primarily in the form of student financial aid).  Variables include revenues and 
expenditures, staffing, and student enrollment profiles, among other variables.   
Measuring Strategic Management  
 Institutions must constantly adjust strategies and priorities in order to survive in 
an ever-changing environment.  Organizations that fail to adapt to these environmental 
shifts in a market setting such as that of higher education may experience a drop in 
overall performance and a decline in clientele interest in goods and services the 
organization provides.  In this study, three types of resource strategies are examined—
revenues, expenditures, and pricing.16  The pursuit and allocation of resources should tap 
how executives are setting priorities and enacting change in the organization.  Resources 
are required to spur improvements, so changes in revenues, expenditures, and pricing 
strategies should each led to additional changes in performance (equity, affordability, 
efficiency). Here, measures of strategy are calculated as a change variable, or the percent 
change from time t to time t+1 (i.e. (strategyt-strategyt-1)/(strategyt-1)).  Because some 
cases generated outliers that are likely to produce inaccurate findings, the values of 
outliers are replaced with maximum or minimum values that corresponded with a three 
standard deviation from the mean for the variable of interest.  This solution requires a 
                                                          
16 It could be argued that revenues are a measure of performance as opposed to strategy.  Still, the 
measures of revenues here also reflect decisions to pursue specific types of resources. 
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slight drop in cases but also allows for a better general assessment of strategies in these 
organizations. 
Institutions of higher education must monitor incomes and expenditures in order 
to achieve any non-financial goals or priorities (i.e. accountability, equity, or 
affordability) as each actionable goal requires some type of resource.  First, presidents 
are often expected to generate revenues from a variety of sources (state allocations, 
private donations, etc.); these revenue streams have become increasingly important as 
state allocations continue to decline at a somewhat rapid pace.  If presidents are unable 
to maintain a certain level of revenue, uncertainty is likely to affect the organization as 
some units may receive budget cuts or even be closed (one example would be that a 
university cuts a major from curriculum options).  Three measures are used here to 
capture changes in revenues—change in revenue from private gifts and contracts, change 
in revenue from federal grants and contracts, and change in total revenue.  Change in 
total revenue may indicate turbulent environments in which universities are coping with 
declining appropriations or other type of income.  Alternatively, an increase in revenue 
can tap the ability of the institution’s managers to play to their advantage in finding 
additional sources of revenue.  This may be related to gaining additional funds from 
government sources, alumni, student tuition and fees, or various types of commercial 
sales.  Within total revenue, change in revenue from federal grants and contracts and 
change in endowment are two specific sources of funding that schools emphasize to a 
varying degree.  The former will be larger when the president places priority on 
acquiring national grants that are often seen as means to improving the financial 
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stability, reputation, and scholarly output of the institution.  The latter focuses on 
building relationships with alumni constituency groups and raising private money.  This 
strategy is often targeted to very specific audiences and can generate funds for a variety 
of purposes (scholarships, infrastructure, beautification, etc.). 
After generating funding from a variety of sources, a university president must 
then determine how to allocate resources internally in a manner that will help the 
institution realize its performance goals.  Change in total expenditures often captures 
overall change in strategy as related to how the president wants to allocate the 
institution’s limited resources.   Institutions might choose to spend more in one year to 
try to gain additional revenues from new programs or services in later years, or they may 
restrict overall expenditures to focus more narrowly on some services over others.  
Beyond considering the overall change in expenditures, a change in the share of 
expenditures related to educational purposes versus research purposes provides a 
measure of a clear trade-off that can provide some indication of the president’s 
underlying goals and values.  More funding towards education-related expenses may 
indicate a strategy to increase the quality of instruction offered to students, which is a 
core task of the organization.  Increasing or decreasing the share of education-related 
expenditures also requires some trade-off with auxiliary costs such as supplementary 
student services that are not always explicitly linked to salient student outcomes.  
Additional funding to research-related programs, on the other hand, could suggest that a 
president believes that improving research can result in better in-classroom experiences 
and higher levels of student outcomes. 
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 Finally, pricing strategies present an important strategic lever in the context of 
higher education.  Though not traditionally considered in public management literature, 
pricing strategies can be quite important for many organizations that operate in market 
environments.  In the case of higher education, two pricing measures have important 
effects on overall revenue.  First, change in student sticker price (measured as the in-
state tuition and fees for full-time undergraduates) captures the decision to increase 
revenues directly through students.  This change variable is rarely negative; the negative 
values that do exist in this data are usually due to small adjustments in state regulations.  
Pricing strategies extend beyond changes in sticker price, however, and must also 
account for discount rates, or the ratio of total institutional grant aid relative to gross 
tuition revenues at a college or university.  In other words, tuition discounting is price 
discrimination in which different students pay different prices for the same educational 
opportunities.  Discounts are commonly focused on low-income students who may not 
be able to attend the university without adequate assistance.  If a college relies heavily 
on discounting, a change in tuition may not generate any additional revenue.  For this 
sample, the absolute sticker price and discount rate have a correlation of .53, but the 
change in these measures from year to year have little in common (-.02). 
Predicting Strategy 
 While many factors may drive strategic change, this study will focus on whether 
managerial characteristics and the underlying values these characteristics reflect have 
any effect on change.  Models include controls for previous employment, presidential 
turnover, the total years of a president’s term, the president’s h-index, whether the 
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presidents has a Ph.D., whether the president’s prior organization was outside of higher 
education, and whether the president is black, Latino, or female. 
Dichotomous variables are included for whether the president’s most recent 
managerial role was within another institution of higher education, was in a private firm, 
or was in a public agency (as opposed to being an internal hire); while these three 
categories are broad and contain a variety of backgrounds, they should still provide 
insight on whether differences exist between internal and external hires.  For example, 
some individuals in the sample become presidents after serving as a governor, lawyer, 
CEO of a private business, or director of a non-profit organization.  These individuals 
may have a different effect on performance compared to presidents hired from another 
higher education role because of differing values, norms, and expectations for what the 
institution can or should do.   
To further control for individual values, variables are included in all models for 
whether a president has a Ph.D. and the strength of the president’s h-index.  Both 
measures should capture the propensity of the president to value research initiatives.  As 
mentioned above, the h-index is a measure of academic reputation that is designed to be 
comparable across disciplines.  An index of ten means that the individual has ten 
publications with each cited at least ten times.  The higher the h-index, the more a 
president might focus on core institutional functions related to classroom instruction and 
research, which will influence the composition of revenue and expenditures.  
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Next, controls are included for demographics—whether a president is Black, 
Latino, or female.17  Each of these groups is likely to have experiences and career 
patterns that differ from the modal white, male manager (Jacobsen, Palus, and Bowling 
2010; Karnig 1980, Saint-Germain 1989, Lublin 1999).  These differences can then 
translate into different perceptions of environmental stressors and the types of strategies 
that the organization should pursue.  It should also be noted that Black and Latino 
presidents are more likely to oversee HBCUs and HSIs that have higher levels of 
underrepresented student populations.  This context may require presidents to seek 
strategic change in specific ways.   
Presidential turnover is measured as a dichotomous variable noting a president’s 
first year in office.  Presidents might alter strategies little during their first year in office 
because they are adjusting to a new organization and determining what strategies to 
prioritize in order to improve the organization.  Alternatively, presidents could choose to 
start their terms with sweeping changes if they perceive large problems that need to be 
addressed with some immediacy or if they do not agree with the strategies of the 
outgoing president.   
Total tenure, measured as the number of years an individual has served as 
president of the institution, captures the adjustment of the president to the organization 
over time.  On one hand, this may be associated with an increase in changes as the 
president gains more power and expands her network.  On the other hand, it is possible 
                                                          
17 Other racial and ethnic categories were not included due to the rare occurrence of these presidents. 
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that longer tenures are associated with less change if inertia and an unwillingness to 
pursue innovation occur.   
Controls 
Though not the focus of this study, controls for organizational performance, task 
complexity, institutional structures, and environmental turbulence have been included to 
avoid the pitfalls of underspecification.  Past research has shown that poor performance 
often acts as a driver of strategic change in order to turn around organizations (Cyert and 
March 1963, March and Simon 1958).  When organizations are not performing as 
expected, managers will be pressured to change the organization in order to keep it from 
failing.  Managers overseeing these institution are also more likely to take larger risks in 
order to maintain some level of stability in the organization.  On the other hand, 
organizations performing at or above expectations may feel little pressure to pursue large 
changes.  These organizations can continue to do well, at least in the short-term, by 
making changes at the margins.  Performance in this study is measured through 
efficiency, or the number of degrees produced per 100 full time students.  While many 
specifications of performance may be examined in this sample, this indicator is available 
across the entire span of the dataset and is one of the most commonly cited measures 
across state performance accountability systems.  This variable is lagged such that 
performance two years ago is linked to strategy in the current year.  The additional lag is 
included as the availability of this data can take some time to organization at the end of 
each academic year. 
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Task complexity is captured through three measures of diversity in the student 
enrollment profile—the percent of black students, the percent of Hispanic students, and 
the percent of part-time students.  Each of these variables serve as an indicator for at-risk 
and vulnerable student populations that often require additional support and resources 
from the institution.  Many of these students must find employment while attending 
school, and many have greater support demands from family and friends (London 1989, 
Thayer 2000).  They may take longer to graduate and may not attend school in a 
continuous manner.  Institutions with large at-risk populations must develop methods 
(summer programs, learning communities, counseling services) to help these students 
progress towards graduation. 
Additional institutional structures have also been included to ensure that models 
are not underspecified.  Student access is measured through logged in-state tuition and 
fees, or “sticker price” (this measure is excluded when tuition is used as a dependent 
variable).  Total student enrollment (logged) captures institutional size and represents the 
traditional mechanism though which colleges and universities have often received 
funding from state policymakers.  The percent of full-time faculty may influence the 
demands of faculty constituent groups on the university in terms of benefits, spending, 
and student support.  Finally, the level of overall resources to students is measured 
through instructional spending per full-time equivalent student (logged). 
To assess whether turbulence in the external environment affects organizational 
strategy, I control for the change in state appropriations to higher education, the change 
in state unemployment, and the presence of a state-mandated performance funding 
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policy.  Appropriations are a measure of resources that has been declining at alarming 
rates in most states (i.e. a “race to the bottom”).  Mortenson (2010), for example, 
estimates that average state support for higher education will reach zero by 2059, with 
many states zeroing out much sooner (such as Colorado in 2019, Iowa in 2029, an South 
Carolina in 2031).  These trends have forced many colleges and universities to 
reconsider how to maintain current levels of revenue and spending.  Second, state 
unemployment rates provide a measure of competition for state allocations.  In times of 
lean economic years, higher education is one of the first budget categories cut while 
more funding is focused on welfare programs (see the recent discussion of the balance 
wheel hypothesis in Delaney and Doyle 2011).  Rises in unemployment rates are also 
associated with increases in enrollments in higher education (Betts and McFarland 
1995); these changes in enrollments create a need to alter institutional strategies.  
Performance-funding policies are largely touted by policymakers as a mechanism by 
which universities will improve student performance, but these policies have also 
produced some uncertainty for administrators who must adjust to new expectations.  
Though research is at best mixed on whether these policies work to improve student 
outcomes, many recognize that the presence of these policies is likely to generate some 
type of response or reaction from university presidents (see, for example, Rutherford and 
Rabovsky 2014). 
Methods 
When dealing with time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data, it is essential that 
scholars be cognizant of problems such as serial autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.  
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Following prescriptions for the use of panel data, three models are provided for 
comparison for each dependent variable—ordinary least squares (OLS) models with 
clustered errors, OLS models with clustered errors and a lagged dependent variable, and 
fixed effects models with lagged dependent variable.  While fixed effects models may 
absorb a large share of the variance, variables that maintain significance across all 
models should provide higher levels of confidence in findings.  Further, all models 
include year fixed effects to further control for the autoregressive nature of these 
institutions.  Finally, all models use independent variables from time t to predict changes 
in the dependent variable in time t+1.  This follows the assumption that decisions related 
to strategic change for next year are made by considering the performance and needs of 
the organization this year. 
Descriptive statistics for variables pertinent to this study are shown in Table 4 
below.  Though NCES data are available through 2010, there exists a small percentage 
of nonsystematic missing observations (all data are self-reported and therefore may 
occasionally be missing from institutional reports).  As each dependent variable 
presented below is measured as change, one year of observations is absorbed in order to 
create the variables of interest.  Finally, the analyses provided below also exclude any 
institution years in which an organization had an interim president in office.  These 
presidents are tasked with maintaining the institution until the next president is hired and 
are largely not involved with implementing strategic changes.   
All factors considered, tables include 2205 organization-years for 155 institutions 
between 1993 and 2009.  Almost ten percent of university presidents were hired from 
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outside of the higher education industry while over half were hired from provosts’ 
offices.  The average tenure of presidents in this sample is between five and six years 
(the average tenure has decreased over time).  Both minority racial and ethnic groups 
and women are underrepresented in the president’s office, through the representation of 
these groups has increased somewhat over time.  The majority of presidents have a PhD 
(these degrees come from a wide variety of fields), and the average h-index is just under 
ten.18 
 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics, Predicting Strategic 
Change       
  Mean SD Min Max 
Strategic Change     
∆ Private Gifts .106 .478 -1.000 2.189 
∆ Federal Funding .094 .249 -.914 3.812 
∆ Total Revenue .058 .087 -.889 1.000 
∆ Education-Related Expenditures -.003 .043 -.430 0.480 
∆ Research-Related Expenditures .027 .284 -.991 8.878 
∆ Total Expenditures .056 .064 -.476 .864 
∆ Sticker Price .071 .075 -.541 1.069 
∆ Discount Rate .044 .249 -.997 .997 
Inside/Outside Characteristics     
Most recent position- other university .645 .479 0 1 
Most recent position- private firm .027 .162 0 1 
Most recent position- public agency .057 .233 0 1 
Socialization Characteristics     
PhD .852 .355 0 1 
H-index 9.388 10.849 0 85 
Female .138 .341 0 1 
Black .089 .284 0 1 
Latino .024 .155 0 1 
Managerial Turnover and Experience     
                                                          
18 This measure is imperfect, as it may vary by field.  In the social sciences, the average h-index can range 
from 2.8 (law) to 7.6 (economics), while STEM fields may expect h-indices of 12 or more for promotion 
to associate professor.   
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Table 4 Continued     
     
First Year of Presidency .111 .315 0 1 
Experience (years) 5.485 5.091 0 34 
Controls     
Degrees per 100 FTE Students 23.761 3.689 4.769 48.930 
Percent Black Students 11.070 17.650 .214 95.917 
Percent Hispanic Students 5.099 7.908 0.000 62.645 
Percent Part-time Students 19.090 11.823 1.198 60.349 
Instruction per FTE Student (logged) 8.861 .390 7.247 10.346 
Enrollment (logged) 9.908 0.620 7.398 12.250 
Sticker Price (logged) 8.281 0.479 6.983 10.043 
Percent Full-time Faculty 49.607 16.757 0.000 95.461 
State Performance Funding Policy .206 .404 0 1 
State Funding for Higher Education (2009 
millions) 
1413.10
6 
1209.04
7 52.327 
6315.97
1 
State Unemployment Rate 5.545 1.858 2.267 13.733 
 
 
 
3.6 Findings 
 Results for all revenue, expenditure, and pricing models are provided in Tables 5, 
6, and 7 below.  Overall, models show that little strategic change appears to be taking 
place in these organizations; changes vary from year to year (the sign of the lagged 
dependent variables is negative) such that shifts are piecemeal.  No model appears to 
explain a significant amount of variance in change, even when lagged dependent 
variables are included.  One explanation may be that higher education presents a hard 
test of the general expectations about strategic change simply because these institutions 
are highly autoregressive and difficult to change over short periods of time (see Cohen 
and March’s 1986 discussion of higher education as organized anarchies with 
problematic goals, unclear technology, and fluid participation).  In other words, it is 
challenging for any shift in strategic goals to change the performance outcomes of the 
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organization quickly.  Substantial literature in higher education argues that the changes 
that do take place are only evident at the margins with an unchanging center (Leslie and 
Fretwell 1996; Tierney 1998, 1999).  However, there are still several significant 
relationships that suggest managers with specific backgrounds approach change 
differently than others. 
 In Table 5, outside hires from private firms are associated with negative changes 
in private revenue streams.  Conversely, executives with higher h-index scores, or a 
higher propensity to value research, are linked to higher levels of change in increasing 
private sources of revenue.  That these two opposite types of presidents have different 
effects on private revenues may also be related to what types of perceptions they 
generate among private donors and alumni.  For example, a renowned scholar may 
generate higher levels of trust and buy-in, while a former firm executive may generate 
some level of uncertainty.  As related to federal grants and contracts, presidents with a 
Ph.D. are associated with higher levels of increases, while female presidents and first 
year presidents are associated with decreasing funding (this may be viewed as a 
suboptimal type of change).  Presidents with a Ph.D. may have higher levels of 
awareness of various federal grant programs that can provide resources to various units 
within the university.  The link between female presidents and federal grants is less 
clear.  It may be that female presidents are less assertive in encouraging faculty to pursue 
that grants, or it may be that females are hired at institutions that have historically placed 
less value on this type of revenue.  Presidents are likely to see this source of revenue 
drop following the first year in office, as the president is likely to be occupied with 
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adjusting to a new work environment.  Interestingly, while some characteristics are 
related to the two key sources of funding examined here, no type of president appears 
more or less likely to create change in the total revenue of the institution.  Instead, 
individuals may only be able to focus on various shares of total revenue in order to 
maintain overall revenue and, consequently, stability in the organization in the presence 
of declining state appropriations.   
 In Table 5, organizational performance appears to contribute to positive changes 
in private and federal grants and contracts but does not appear to influence overall 
revenue.  Instruction per student drives some negative changes but, again, does not 
generate change in total revenue.  Finally, the percent of part-time faculty is related to 
negative changes in federal grants.  This is likely due to the fact that part-time faculty 
may have teaching responsibilities that overshadow research initiatives. 
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Table 5: Effect of University Presidents on Changes in Institutional Revenues 
  ∆ Private Gifts (t+1) 
∆ Federal Funding 
(t+1) 
∆ Total Revenue 
(t+1) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Most Recent Position- Other University -0.0331 -0.0407 -0.0059 -0.0103 0.0052 0.0061 
  (0.0248) (0.0378) (0.0103) (0.0180) (0.0039) (0.0061) 
Most Recent Position- Private Firm -0.0802* -0.0748 0.0055 0.0075 0.0042 0.0090 
  (0.0271) (0.1080) (0.0187) (0.0524) (0.0074) (0.0179) 
Most Recent Position- Public Agency -0.0287 -0.0158 0.0155 0.0341 0.0014 0.0118 
  (0.0364) (0.0827) (0.0190) (0.0363) (0.0057) (0.0124) 
PhD -0.0046 -0.0225 0.0185+ 0.0131 -0.0053 -0.0092 
  (0.0215) (0.0555) (0.0094) (0.0259) (0.0056) (0.0088) 
H-index 0.0018* 0.0025 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
  (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Female -0.0301 0.0248 -0.0161+ -0.0197 0.0023 0.0019 
  (0.0277) (0.0540) (0.0084) (0.0248) (0.0043) (0.0085) 
Black -0.0139 0.0701 -0.0134 -0.0088 -0.0050 -0.0034 
  (0.0394) (0.0772) (0.0128) (0.0367) (0.0054) (0.0125) 
Latino -0.0071 0.0091 -0.0271 -0.0084 -0.0157 -0.0175 
  (0.0493) (0.1274) (0.0243) (0.0591) (0.0097) (0.0202) 
First year -0.0327 -0.0289 -0.0218+ -0.0207 -0.0066 -0.0025 
  (0.0332) (0.0395) (0.0116) (0.0186) (0.0042) (0.0064) 
Experience -0.0013 -0.0023 -0.0008 -0.0010 0.0003 0.0005 
  (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
Lag Degree Efficiency 0.0074+ 0.0217* 0.0039* 0.0045 0.0007 -0.0005 
  (0.0040) (0.0068) (0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0004) (0.0011) 
Percent Black Students 0.0019 0.0196* 0.0001 -0.0098* 0.0002+ -0.0012 
  (0.0012) (0.0088) (0.0002) (0.0039) (0.0001) (0.0013) 
       
70 
 
Table 5 Continued        
Percent Hispanic Students 0.0009 0.0160 0.0001 0.0076 0.0005* -0.0022 
  (0.0011) (0.0171) (0.0005) (0.0068) (0.0002) (0.0023) 
Percent Part-Time Students 0.0005 0.0030 0.0007+ 0.0033* -0.0000 0.0006 
  (0.0008) (0.0037) (0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0001) (0.0006) 
Instruction/FTE Student (logged) -0.1295* -0.3764* -0.0857* -0.5834* -0.0118 -0.1289* 
  (0.0334) (0.1380) (0.0357) (0.0638) (0.0112) (0.0222) 
Sticker Price (logged) 0.0060 -0.0536 0.0103 0.0807 0.0014 0.0238 
  (0.0289) (0.1074) (0.0137) (0.0496) (0.0060) (0.0169) 
Total Enrollment (logged) -0.0224* 0.2595 0.0099 -0.3224* 0.0022 -0.1347* 
  (0.0107) (0.2036) (0.0078) (0.0927) (0.0019) (0.0318) 
Percent Part-Time Faculty -0.0004 0.0011 -0.0008* -0.0018* 0.0000 -0.0004* 
  (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Performance Funding Policy 0.0193 0.0876* 0.0066 0.0043 0.0030 0.0126+ 
  (0.0225) (0.0419) (0.0095) (0.0197) (0.0038) (0.0067) 
State Appropriations to Higher Education 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000* 
  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
State Unemployment Rate -0.0044 -0.0090 0.0005 0.0042 0.0001 -0.0007 
  (0.0088) (0.0175) (0.0032) (0.0080) (0.0019) (0.0027) 
LDV  -0.2138*  -0.1905*  -0.2783* 
   (0.0233)  (0.0214)  (0.0239) 
Constant 1.2152* 0.3985 0.5279* 7.5642* 0.1005 2.3258* 
  (0.2734) (2.7765) (0.2040) (1.2756) (0.0712) (0.4394) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Institutional FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 2039 2029 2205 2205 2205 2205 
R2 0.050 0.022 0.084 0.084 0.090 0.112 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05       
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Table 6: Effect of University Presidents on Changes in Institutional Expenditures 
  
∆ Share of Educational-
Related Expenditures 
(t+1) 
∆ Share of Research-
Related Expenditures 
(t+1) 
∆ Total Expenditures 
(t+1) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Most Recent Position- Other 
University 0.0031+ 0.0068* 0.0109 0.0052 -0.0004 0.0042 
  (0.0017) (0.0034) (0.0166) (0.0223) (0.0027) (0.0044) 
Most Recent Position- Private Firm -0.0094 -0.0135 0.0035 -0.0112 0.0004 -0.0023 
  (0.0074) (0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0643) (0.0061) (0.0128) 
Most Recent Position- Public Agency 0.0023 -0.0011 0.0030 0.0234 0.0041 0.0154+ 
  (0.0022) (0.0068) (0.0133) (0.0452) (0.0042) (0.0089) 
PhD -0.0006 0.0015 -0.0033 -0.0138 -0.0003 -0.0006 
  (0.0023) (0.0049) (0.0116) (0.0322) (0.0033) (0.0063) 
H-index -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0002 0.0005 0.0003* 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Female -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0127 0.0032 0.0017 -0.0019 
  (0.0024) (0.0046) (0.0170) (0.0308) (0.0035) (0.0061) 
Black -0.0014 0.0059 -0.0098 -0.0040 -0.0028 0.0001 
  (0.0029) (0.0068) (0.0148) (0.0452) (0.0044) (0.0090) 
Latino -0.0017 -0.0171 -0.0279 0.0317 -0.0199* -0.0194 
  (0.0037) (0.0116) (0.0375) (0.0772) (0.0075) (0.0145) 
First year -0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0068 0.0086 0.0020 0.0044 
  (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0117) (0.0228) (0.0039) (0.0046) 
Experience 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0023 0.0000 -0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Lag Degree Efficiency -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0023 0.0012 0.0006+ 0.0011 
  (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0004) (0.0008) 
Percent Black Students -0.0000 0.0009 0.0002 -0.0118* 0.0002* -0.0015 
  (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0048) (0.0001) (0.0009) 
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Table 6 Continued        
       
Percent Hispanic Students -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0061 0.0005* -0.0023 
  (0.0001) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0085) (0.0001) (0.0017) 
Percent Part-Time Students -0.0002* -0.0003 0.0002 0.0034+ 0.0001 0.0013* 
  (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0020) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
Instruction/FTE Student (logged) 0.0022 0.0040 -0.0927+ -0.6562* -0.0166+ -0.2027* 
  (0.0046) (0.0118) (0.0545) (0.0785) (0.0088) (0.0160) 
Sticker Price (logged) -0.0044 -0.0037 0.0064 -0.0061 0.0019 0.0348* 
  (0.0032) (0.0092) (0.0176) (0.0609) (0.0042) (0.0121) 
Total Enrollment (logged) 0.0001 -0.0245 0.0028 -0.1453 0.0011 -0.1294* 
  (0.0012) (0.0171) (0.0124) (0.1136) (0.0018) (0.0227) 
Percent Part-Time Faculty -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0003* 
  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Performance Funding Policy 0.0002 0.0001 0.0213 0.0061 0.0020 0.0106* 
  (0.0018) (0.0036) (0.0148) (0.0241) (0.0025) (0.0048) 
State Appropriations to Higher 
Education (Constant 2009 Millions) 0.0000 0.0000+ 0.0000+ -0.0001* 0.0000+ 0.0000* 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
State Unemployment Rate -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0032 0.0027 -0.0023* -0.0050* 
  (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0060) (0.0099) (0.0011) (0.0020) 
LDV  -0.1831*  -0.2139*  -0.1547* 
   (0.0229)  (0.0288)  (0.0213) 
Constant 0.0203 0.2169 0.6442+ 7.2080* 0.1632* 2.7979* 
  (0.0288) (0.2350) (0.3391) (1.5671) (0.0538) (0.3151) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Institutional FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 2157 2157 2153 2151 2205 2205 
R2 0.019 0.022 0.006 0.013 0.103 0.145 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05       
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Table 7: Effect of University Presidents on Institutional Pricing 
  ∆ Sticker Price (t+1) ∆ Discount Rate (t+1) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Most Recent Position- Other University -0.0040 -0.0040 -0.0036 -0.0122 -0.0131 -0.0174 
  (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0057) (0.0105) (0.0115) (0.0194) 
Most Recent Position- Private Firm -0.0056 -0.0052 -0.0012 -0.0099 -0.0299 0.0012 
  (0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0165) (0.0267) (0.0225) (0.0582) 
Most Recent Position- Public Agency -0.0029 -0.0030 -0.0038 -0.0257 -0.0282 -0.0077 
  (0.0059) (0.0056) (0.0114) (0.0198) (0.0207) (0.0397) 
PhD 0.0121* 0.0113* 0.0078 0.0061 0.0038 0.0304 
  (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0081) (0.0112) (0.0122) (0.0280) 
H-index -0.0003* -0.0002* -0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) 
Female -0.0064+ -0.0058+ -0.0048 -0.0023 -0.0012 -0.0003 
  (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0078) (0.0136) (0.0148) (0.0268) 
Black -0.0029 -0.0023 0.0121 0.0245 0.0260 0.0052 
  (0.0062) (0.0058) (0.0116) (0.0197) (0.0210) (0.0396) 
Latino -0.0257* -0.0240* -0.0094 -0.0718+ -0.0707+ -0.0994 
  (0.0091) (0.0088) (0.0186) (0.0409) (0.0420) (0.0640) 
First year -0.0012 -0.0009 0.0019 0.0105 0.0117 0.0000 
  (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0059) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0202) 
Experience -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0027+ 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0015) 
Lag Degree Efficiency -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0042 
  (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0035) 
Percent Black Students 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0000 0.0001 0.0040 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0042) 
Percent Hispanic Students 0.0005* 0.0005* 0.0035 0.0014+ 0.0012 -0.0139+ 
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Table 7 Continued       
       
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0021) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0074) 
Percent Part-Time Students -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0056* 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0019) 
Instruction/FTE Student (logged) -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0209 -0.0246* -0.0304* 0.0625 
  (0.0045) (0.0042) (0.0201) (0.0122) (0.0134) (0.0690) 
Sticker Price (logged)    -0.0155 -0.0162 -0.0806 
     (0.0142) (0.0154) (0.0539) 
Total Enrollment (logged) 0.0063* 0.0060* 0.0491+ -0.0101 -0.0050 0.0308 
  (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0291) (0.0064) (0.0076) (0.1010) 
Percent Part-Time Faculty 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0006 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
Performance Funding Policy 0.0089* 0.0077* 0.0105+ 0.0071 0.0097 0.0095 
  (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0062) (0.0118) (0.0129) (0.0214) 
State Appropriations to Higher Education 
(Constant 2009 Millions) -0.0000+ -0.0000+ -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
State Unemployment Rate 0.0036* 0.0033* 0.0066* -0.0015 -0.0019 0.0020 
  (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0087) 
LDV  0.0693* 0.0129  -0.0935* -0.1376* 
   (0.0326) (0.0223)  (0.0352) (0.0220) 
Constant 0.0109 0.0101 -0.3161 0.5259* 0.5508* -0.1021 
  (0.0443) (0.0413) (0.3785) (0.1530) (0.1633) (1.3891) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Institutional FE No No Yes No No Yes 
N 2198 2198 2198 2194 2194 2194 
R2 0.116 0.119 0.051 0.006 0.014 0.047 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05       
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 Significant relationships are even scarcer for institutional expenditures (Table 6).  
This is somewhat surprising, as presidents should have more power to change how the 
institution allocates dollars compared to efforts to change revenue streams (in other 
words, efforts to change revenue streams may or may not result in actual changes, but 
the president is directly able to influence expenditures).  This may be due to the fact that 
these institutions are very slow to change, and units generally receive similar funding 
from year to year unless dramatic change is implemented (an entire program of study is 
eliminated).  Presidents hired from other universities (outside of the organization but 
within the industry) are associated with positive changes to education-related 
expenditures.  This may be connected to classroom or technology-related innovations 
and the adoption of new course requirements, but determining micro-level explanations 
would require information beyond the limitations of this dataset.   
While no single type of president strategically increases or decreases research-
related funding, two patterns do appear for overall expenditures.  Presidents with higher 
h-index scores significantly and positively institute change in overall spending while 
Latino presidents strategically decrease overall spending.  These two relationships are 
indicative of two approaches to improving an organization.  On the one hand, spending 
more may facilitate innovation and outreach.  On the other, decreasing spending may 
help an institution save money and focus on its core mission.  Further, these two 
strategies may be more appropriate for the types of schools that are inclined to hire 
different types of leaders. 
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In terms of control variables, only the state unemployment rates is significantly 
related to negative changes in overall spending.  It is likely that these changes are related 
to lower funding from states (allocations that would go to higher education are instead 
given to welfare programs) which require institutions to spend less money in order to 
stay in the black. 
 Finally, pricing strategies are increasingly important for institutions of higher 
education in order to maintain both revenue and enrollment stability.  In Table 7, one 
clear relationship appears to matter in terms of connecting managerial values with 
strategic change.  Latino presidents are more likely to change pricing strategies by 
lowering both the sticker price as well as the discount rate (though this finding does not 
hold for institutional fixed effects models).  This may be one way to increase the 
transparency of actual costs, or it may be that these presidents are more attuned to the 
financial burdens on students and their families.  Interestingly, among control variables, 
the percent of Latino students also drives some change in pricing and discount rates.  
Total enrollment and the presence of a state performance funding policy appear to 
increase changes to sticker prices.  Finally, state unemployment rates also appear to 
drive up sticker price; this again is likely a direct effort to address lower allocations from 
the state. 
3.7 Implications  
  Findings in this study indicate that university presidents engage in little strategic 
planning that is evident through aggregate revenues, expenditures, and pricing at the 
institutional level.  This implies a bleak picture for other types of strategies, as most 
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strategies are likely to need monetary resources in order to be effective.19  Not only did 
individual managerial characteristics lack power in predicting strategic change well, but 
controls for organizational structure, organizational performance, and external pressures 
tested here also did not appear to have consistent relationships with strategic change.  
Still, a few exceptions provide some potential indicators of when strategic change might 
take place in a more systematic manner.  University presidents with higher h-index 
scores (who are likely to have values related to research that are significantly different 
from other presidents) may make decisions that are most different from other presidents.  
Likewise, presidents from underrepresented groups appear to manage institutions 
differently than their majority white counterparts.  Findings related to this group are 
largely tentative, as they may be asked to manage institutions that have different 
missions than other public four year universities.   
 In terms of more general theories of strategic planning and strategic change, 
findings here suggest that incremental change is, indeed, the norm to which managers 
comply.  It may be that larger strategic changes are only implemented in more extreme 
cases.  Further, the question of generalizability is also somewhat uncertain.  Institutions 
of higher education often move slowly; this might compare to large federal agencies.  On 
the other hand, these educational organization are under great pressure from 
policymakers and consumers to change and improve, which would suggest some type of 
a more dynamic context similar to more versatile public agencies.  Ultimately, research 
                                                          
19 Figures 5, 6, and 7 in the Appendix also attest to the prevalence of incremental changes across monetary 
and non-monetary processes.  Perhaps this is most clear in Figure 6, where universities clearly hire some 
part-time faculty to handle teaching loads and then back off of this strategy before hiring additional 
personnel in this area. 
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on the implementation of strategic change should be examined in additional settings, 
specifically in other types of agencies or in other countries.   
 While this study provides a point of departure for additional research on strategic 
change, this data may also be leveraged to study change in the context of managerial 
teams.  Data on university provosts/chief academic officers can be matched with data on 
presidents to determine how these two individuals work together to influence 
organizational strategy and performance outcomes.  Finally, private organizations can be 
considered and directly compared to public universities to determine if strategic change 
occurs with more frequency in one of the two contexts.  
 In sum, evidence in public administration is lacking on whether strategic plans 
are implemented, and whether these changes are related to changes in various indicators 
of organizational performance.  While strategic stance may be an important predictor of 
outcomes, much can be gained from teasing apart what causal mechanisms serve as 
antecedents of strategy as well as how strategy, once formed, changes over time. 
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4. REEXAMINING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES: DOES 
ADMINISTRATIVE INTENSITY MATTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE? 
 
4.1 Overview 
This study examines, the relationship between organizational structure (size and 
complexity) and administrative intensity and, subsequently, the effect of administrative 
intensity on organizational performance in the context of four year institutions of higher 
education in the United States between 2003 and 2009.  Organizational size has a 
negative effect on administrative intensity and supports the notion of economies of scale.  
Size and complexity also interact such that complexity has a greater effect on total 
administrative intensity in larger organizations.  While administrative intensity has a 
nonlinear relationship with degree productivity, suggesting a tipping point of 30% total 
administration, it has little direct effect on graduation rates. 
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4.2 Introduction 
Considerable theoretical and empirical literature has developed on the link 
between organizational structure and performance.  Gulick (1937) championed the 
argument that structural principles existed by which organizations might obtain some 
optimal level of performance.  These assertions, however, were challenged by Simon 
(1946) as being both contradictory and vague.  Simon’s critique was generally accepted 
by later scholars despite empirical research providing support for such structural-
performance relationships (see the summary in Hammond 1990).  Recently, scholars 
have revisited Gulick’s call for research that links structural variables to performance in 
research on span of control (Meier and Bohte 2000; Woodward 1980), specialization 
(Romzek and Dubnick 1994; Thompson 1965), and centralization (Andrews at al. 2009; 
Moon 1999).   
Despite popular debate on bureaucratic bloat, less scholarly attention has been 
given to the concept of administrative intensity, or the bureaucratic component of 
organizations.  Though research on identifying the determinants of administrative 
intensity was popular between the 1950s and 1980s, it was quickly overshadowed by a 
concern with the size of bureaucracy more broadly.20  While some public administration 
scholars suggest that more bureaucracy within an organization is linked to inefficiency 
and lower levels of performance (Bohte 2001; Chubb and Moe 1990), others hypothesize 
that bureaucracy can work to address coordination problems while freeing front-line 
                                                          
20 Here, “bureaucracy” can be defined as a way of administratively organizing groups of people in some 
type of organized hierarchy.  The notion of bureaucracy includes but is not limited to administrative 
intensity. 
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employees to focus on clientele needs (Smith and Meier 1994, 1995; Meier, Polinard, 
and Wrinkle 2000).  The purpose of this study is to determine which of these two 
hypotheses is supported in the case of administrative intensity.  In other words, are 
higher levels of administration indeed negatively related to performance, or is a certain 
level of administration good for managing performance? 
This study provides an empirical assessment of the causes and consequences of 
administrative intensity, with a specific focus on three contributions.  First, in the 
context of institutions of higher education, the concept of administrative intensity will be 
measured in two ways to determine what type of administration matters.  This can have 
implications for the robustness of hypotheses related to organizational structure and 
performance, and will encourage scholars to be more precise in defining and measuring 
concepts.  Second, current theoretical expectations about the relationships among size, 
complexity, and administrative intensity are tested to determine more accurately the 
functional form of these relationships following conflicting evidence in existing 
literature.  Finally, the primary contribution of this research is to examine whether 
administrative structures matter for organizational performance.  It is important to 
understand how administrative intensity can affect performance in terms of evaluating 
when and how administration may be helpful or hurtful.  For example, some 
administration may help an organization manage and even improve performance through 
coordination and cooperation.  However, this advantage may disappear should the size 
of administration in an organization pass a tipping point in which adding an additional 
administrator detracts from other needs within the organization. 
82 
 
In the discussion below, the progression of theory linking organizational 
structure, administrative intensity, and performance is first reviewed to generate 
empirically testable hypotheses.  Relationships are explored in the realm of U.S. higher 
education, a sector that has often received criticism for both perceived, and real, 
administrative personnel and cost increases (Bergman 1991; Greene, Kisida, and Mills 
2012).  Findings indicate that organizational size and structural complexity have little 
effect on the share of executive management in these organizations.  For total 
administration (upper and mid-level management), support is found for a curvilinear U-
shaped relationship between size and administration.  Complexity has little independent 
effect but does have a significant effect on total administration when interacted with 
organizational size.  When analysis turns to administration-performance relationships, 
executive administrative intensity has no effect on performance.  The more inclusive 
specification reveals an inverted U-shaped relationship and a tipping point of thirty 
percent with one of two salient student performance measures.  Implications of these 
limited but informative findings suggest that additional contextual factors may influence 
administrative intensity such that administrative intensity may be meaningful for some 
performance indicators over others. 
4.3 Identifying the Determinants of Administrative Intensity 
 Attention to organizational structure began with the work largely through a 
sociological perspective of scholars such as Weber (1946, 1947), Merton et al. (1952), 
Selznick (1949), and Blau (1955).  Following the realization that organizational 
structures could be strategically manipulated to produce certain outcomes (Scott 1975), 
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this line of research quickly accelerated; over eighty articles were produced on the 
relationship between organizational size and administrative intensity between 1950 and 
1975 (see summaries in Kimberly 1976 and Scott 1975).  These studies, not without 
theoretical and empirical problems,21 produced a foundation for understanding the 
linkages among organizational size, complexity, and administrative intensity.   
Organizational size has commonly been defined as either the total number of 
employees or the total size of assets in an organization.  The relationship between size 
and the bureaucratization of agencies generated a sizeable line of research, as many 
claimed that larger organizations operated inefficiently by containing too many 
administrators (Caplow 1957; Parkinson 1957).  Empirical studies testing this 
hypothesis, however, produced an array of findings.  Some scholars found a positive 
relationship between size and administrative intensity (Terrain and Mills 1955; 
Tsouderos 1955), while others detected a strong negative relationship (Bendix 1956; 
Melman 1951). The latter group proposed that instead of a disproportionate growth in 
administration, economies of scale may be realized such that the addition of employees 
undertaking tasks resembling the existing employee pool could be achieved without a 
need for additional administrators to manage coordination.  Instead, organizations could 
be more efficient in producing additional goods and services by increasing the number of 
employees tasked with production while holding the number of managerial employees 
constant.  Even though this proposition appeared logical, it was not found to be robust, 
                                                          
21 While Kimberly (1976) provided a summary of this research, he also criticized a number of conceptual 
and empirical problems that prevented direct comparability across studies.  Though this may remain a 
problem, it does not diminish the importance of linking structure to performance. 
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as further research continued to detect an array of positive, negative, and null 
relationships between organizational size and the proportion of administrative employees 
(Baker and Davis 1954; Rushing 1966). 
 Models of size and administration evolved with the introduction of a measure of 
structural complexity in a study of hospitals by Anderson and Warkov in 1961.  
Organizational complexity generally encompasses the division of labor and degree of 
differentiation among employees such that greater specialization requires more 
administrative coordination. Though most agree that complexity is distinct from size, a 
precise definition of this concept remains to be established.  Perhaps one of the clearest 
descriptions of complexity can be found in Hall (1982), who defines three types of 
complexity—horizontal differentiation, vertical differentiation, and spatial dispersion.  
Horizontal differentiation describes the variance in tasks among different positions and 
subunits, while vertical differentiation focuses on the number of hierarchical levels in the 
organization.  Spatial dispersion, on the other hand, is related to the physical geography 
of organizational facilities.  The operationalization of complexity generally uses the 
number of vertical layers or the number of subunits (i.e., number of different tasks) in 
organizations; spatial measures are less frequent in this line of research, and the degree 
of specialization (i.e., difficulty of tasks) is often quite difficult to measure.  This study 
will focus on horizontal differentiation, because the number of vertical layers may be 
misleading in the context of higher education.  A higher number of vertical components 
may be an indication of red tape and bureaucracy, but may not measure how many types 
of goods or services an organization is responsible for producing.  Adding an additional 
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subunit to an organization, however, requires a new set of processes as well as additional 
employees to coordinate them.  
Previous work has suggested a positive correlation between size and complexity, 
as well as a positive relationship between complexity and administration.  Explanations 
for these two relationships follow the logic that higher levels of complexity create more 
challenging coordination problems and, subsequently, a need for additional 
administration in the organization (Blau 1970; Rushing 1967).  Organizational scholars 
largely hypothesize that organizational size, while positively related to complexity, 
should be indirectly and negatively related to administrative intensity as expected under 
economies of scale principles. 
 Early interest in the structural determinants of administrative intensity provided 
few answers to theoretical propositions and generated many unanswered questions.  
Reliance on case studies and cross-sectional data in this line of research did not allow for 
the tracking of changes over time or tests of causality (but see Holdaway and Blowers 
1971; Freeman and Hannan 1975).  Further, scholars have recognized but not fully 
addressed the need to measure size, complexity, and administrative intensity as 
heterogeneous concepts.  Rushing (1966) was among the first to produce multiple 
measures of administration by including six ratios of administrative categories to 
personnel in a study of manufacturing firms.  Additionally, the concept of administrative 
intensity was used solely as a dependent variable such whose effect on the general 
performance of organizations scholars failed to determine empirically.   
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Greater interest in pinpointing the determinants of administrative intensity has 
accompanied concepts like New Public Management, along with calls for accountability, 
efficiency, and managerial cutbacks in public organizations.  Recent studies test for an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between size and administrative intensity but find, 
overall, that the relationship supports the notion of economies of scale (Andrews and 
Boyne 2009; Boyne and Meier 2013; Ting, Dollery, and Villano 2013).  In other words, 
as the size of an organization grows, administrative intensity will decline at a 
diminishing rate that will approach zero but does not become positive.  Andrews and 
Boyne (2014) also examine the effect of complexity, while Boyne and Meier (2013) and 
Ting et al. (2013) examine the effect of turbulence on administrative intensity.   
These studies are notable for expanding nonlinear and interactive effects in large-
N panel data that can provide greater consensus on the determinants of administrative 
intensity.  However, they do not consider whether varying levels of administration are 
necessarily good or bad for the performance of organizations.  In other words, while we 
might be able to identify why levels of administration or bureaucracy vary by 
organization, we have little empirical information on the effects of this administrative 
variance on the organization.  Differences in organizational performance, however, are 
perhaps the single most important dependent variable among organizational theories to 
date.  Are higher levels of administration burdensome and inefficient, or can 
administrative intensity aid coordination efforts that can streamline processes to produce 
higher levels of performance?   
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4.4. Bureaucracy and Performance  
Within the private management setting, the most common research on the link 
between administrative intensity and performance is related to labor productivity in 
manufacturing firms.22  Melman (1951) argued that administrative intensity and labor 
production were separate processes, such that greater administration does not increase 
performance.  Supporting this claim, Bidwell and Kasarda (1975) found administrative 
intensity to be negatively correlated to performance in school districts, though no direct 
comparison was empirically assessed.  Other studies (Holland 1963; Delehanty 1968; 
Pondy 1969) found that greater administrative intensity can boost performance for 
manufacturing firms.  The findings of these positive relationships have been called into 
question, however, due to the use of problematic assumptions about the direction of 
relationships and model misspecification (Dalton et al. 1980; Dogramaci 1977).  Further, 
it is also the case that the effect of administrative intensity of organizations is likely to 
vary across and within industries.  For example, higher levels of administration with 
police departments may have implications that are far different than those in nursing 
homes.  Even so, there should still be some patterns that emerge and can inform general 
organizational theories and the discussion of the multiple relationships between 
institutional contexts, managerial decisions and actions, and organizational performance.  
Unfortunately, the discrepancies in early findings have not since been addressed in order 
                                                          
22 Connections between administrative intensity and performance have also been conducted in reference to 
productivity, or production per employee, in the financial service industry (Forrester 1980, Carillo and 
Kopelman 1991) and effectiveness, measured as goal attainment, in achievement in K-12 schools (Bidwell 
and Kasarda 1975).   
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to provide consensus on whether the size of administration in an organization has any 
general, significant effect on organizational performance. 
Within public administration, an explicit discussion of the administrative 
intensity-performance link is rarely present.  Largely limited to the discussion of school 
choice and performance, much of this argument has revolved around the direction of 
causality between bureaucracy, a concept that encompasses administrative intensity, and 
organizational performance.  Chubb and Moe (1990) argued that poor performance in 
schools was linked to the expansion of centralized bureaucracy and the subsequent 
limitation of discretion at the school level to address the needs of individual students.  
Defining performance as standardized tests scores, Bohte (2001) found support for this 
argument across multiple grades in Texas schools.  Smith and Meier (1994, 1995) and 
Meier, Polinard, and Wrinkle (2000), however, found that greater bureaucracy was 
caused by poor performance.  These authors argued that their finding might be related to 
the possibility that bureaucracy can work to address coordination problems while freeing 
front-line employees to focus on clientele needs.  In other words, the decision to increase 
bureaucracy may be a specific strategy taken to improve performance.23 
These opposing theories can be directly tested in the case of administrative 
intensity.  On the one hand, low levels of administration may be inadequate to 
coordinate street level employees to ensure satisfactory levels of organizational 
performance.  As administrative intensity increases, additional administrative slack may 
                                                          
23 Related research on managerial capacity (O’Toole and Meier 1999, O’Toole and Meier 2010) has also 
found that sufficient managerial capacity can mitigate the effects of shocks to the organization.  In other 
words, additional administrative intensity, as part of the bureaucracy in an organization, may help buffer 
the organization from shocks in the internal and external environment.  
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be introduced to the system and the burden of coordination problems dispersed such that 
performance is expected to increase.  However, it may be the case that adding additional 
administrators will require some trade-off among resources that will lead to a decline in 
organizational performance.  For example, the decision to hire an additional 
administrator may come at the cost of hiring a front-line employee who can contribute to 
the volume and quality of output for a good or service.  It is also possible that these 
opposing expectations explain pieces of a nonlinear relationship.  When administrative 
intensity is low, increases may help to distribute the tasks of coordination and 
management among a more reasonable number of individuals so that the organization 
can function well.  However, moving beyond some optimal level of administrators may 
come at the cost of needed resources that are central to the mission of the organization.  
In this case, administrative intensity may either have diminishing marginal returns on 
organizational performance or may be related to outcomes in an inverted U form. 
4.5 Administrative Intensity in Higher Education  
Though the general discussion of administrative intensity has waned over the 
past thirty years in academic scholarship, the discussion of “administrative bloat” 
continues to be a contentious point of debate in higher education (Bergman 1991, 
Greene et al. 2012, Hedrick et al. 2009).  The growth in the size and cost of 
administration in this sector has been noted since at least Veblen’s (1918) widely cited 
criticism of the business-like nature of these organizations.  As evident in the discourse 
of state legislatures across the country, disagreements continue today as to what level of 
administration is most efficient in these organizations (Martin and Hill 2012). 
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 Similar to many policy arenas, the concern over the size of administration in 
institutions of higher education has increased in conjunction with greater attention by 
policymakers to regulation and accountability.  The 1980s saw a 46 percent average 
increase in administrative costs in institutions of higher education in the U.S., as well as 
gains in each type of non-faculty employees other than service and maintenance 
personnel.  During the same period, administrative expenditures climbed to 45 cents per 
instructional dollar, up from 19 cents in 1930 (Bergmann 1991).  State legislatures and 
coordinating boards launched studies of administrative costs, and some mandated 
administrative ceilings (Halfond 1991).  Among several descriptive accounts of changes 
in administrative size and cost, Leslie and Rhoades (1995) consider theoretical reasons 
for growth and provide eleven testable hypotheses linking administrative growth to 
structures, regulations, and managerial decisions.  For example, the authors propose that 
greater levels of complexity, operationalized in terms of mission, would lead to greater 
shares of resources being devoted to administration.  Similarly, Gander (1999), 
examining both internal structural components and external dependencies,  found the 
administrative/faculty ratio within universities to be most influenced by size, 
complexity, and external funding.   
This study will address the limitations of current research in three ways.  First, 
while previous studies have focused on institutions of higher education in several 
countries, conducting an empirical test within the United States should be more 
interesting because of the influence of market forces on the industry in the states.  U.S. 
institutions often compete for students under Tiebout-like assumptions, and strategic 
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choices may have immediate effects on the student inputs, processes, and outputs in 
these organizations.  Second, instead of creating a single or indirect measure of 
administrative intensity, this study presents multiple measures of administrative intensity 
to determine if findings hold across different conceptualizations of administration.  As 
Rushing (1966) illustrated, the relationships among these variables may change based on 
how employees are classified as either administrators or front-line staff.  Some ranks of 
managers may have a larger effect on performance than others; likewise, organizational 
growth may require the addition of one type of administrator but may decrease another.  
Finally, by testing the link between administrative intensity and performance, this study 
can inform current debates about the effects of growing bureaucracies, while also 
providing an impetus for theoretical growth in the study of organizations.24 
4.6 Data and Measures  
 This study focuses on administrative intensity in U.S. higher education between 
2003 and 2009.  Institutions of higher education have received negative attention in 
terms of the rising size and cost of administrative employees.   Further, colleges and 
universities have become more familiar with increasing accountability and performance 
pressures from state and federal governing bodies over the last decade.  Thus, ensuring 
acceptable levels of administration and performance are salient issues to the leaders of 
these organizations.   
                                                          
24 Organizational size and complexity may also be considered strategic decisions.  Though outside of the 
scope of this analysis, both structural components may directly affect organizational performance.  To test 
this, both are included as control variables in models of organizational performance. 
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Data were collected through the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System (IPEDS) in the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).  The vast 
majority of public, private non-profit, and private for profit colleges and universities in 
the United States are required to report data to the NCES on a yearly basis in exchange 
for receipt of federal funding (primarily in the form of student financial aid).  Because 
data are self-reported by organizations, however, information on administration is not 
available for the universe of four-year institutions.  As such, this study focuses on a 
sample 1,365 of the total 2,351 public and private non-profit four-year institutions.  
When the two groups are compared, the institutions in the sample are slightly larger in 
size (enrollment), contain a higher level of complexity, and are more likely to be public 
(35 percent of the sample compared to 27 percent in the total population).  However, 
most other common characteristics such as student diversity, the share of expenses for 
education-related services, and degree production are similar to the overall population.  
Still, there is some potential that a degree of bias may be introduced by using only the 
available sample of four-year institutions that report administrative data, and findings 
should be interpreted with caution. 
Dependent Variables 
 In the analyses below, I first examine the factors that influence administrative 
intensity to test whether this sample of organizations confirms theoretical expectations 
related to size and complexity.  For these models, administrative intensity, or the 
bureaucratic component of an organization, will be the dependent variable.  As Rushing 
(1966) argued, definitions of administration are more operational than theoretical which 
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can present many challenges to understanding the significance of administrative 
personnel in organizations.  For example, some administrative categories may increase 
with size while others may decrease. In defining “administration,” a more narrow scope 
might contain only the highest level of administrators while a broader concept might 
include clerical and maintenance employees.25  Within higher education, several types of 
staff are reported on a yearly basis: executive/managerial, other professional, technical 
and paraprofessional, clerical and secretarial, craft, service/maintenance, and faculty (see 
Table 17 in the Appendix for definitions of each).   
Figure 2 shows the growth of each category between 2003 and 2009.  While the 
highest level of administrators experienced little to no change on average, employees 
classified as “other professionals” appear to experience a modest level of growth across 
time.  These employees include individuals working in admissions and recruitment, 
graduation and retention, health services, disciplinary review, and a host of other offices. 
Because the inclusion of multiple groups may have different implications for empirical 
analysis, two measures of administrative staff will be used that align with previous 
research (Ginsberg 2011; Desrochers and Kirshstein 2014).  Administrative staff will be 
defined first as executive/managerial staff only and then as executive/managerial and 
other professional staff.  To create a ratio of administrative staff to other employee 
groups, administrative staff will be divided by the total number of employees in each 
organization. 
                                                          
25 Since the dependent variables used in this study are bound at 0 and 100 and are skewed to the right, a 
robustness check was conducted using the number of administrators (top level managers only) per 100 
FTE students and the number of administrators (top level managers plus “other professionals”) per 100 
FTE students.  Findings for these measures are consistent with those reported below. 
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This approach is similar to measuring management as only executive managers 
as opposed to measuring management as both executive level and mid-level managers.  
While individuals at the top and in the middle both hold some discretion in decision 
making that can shift organizations, the effects of the two groups may be more or less 
effective in terms of overall outcomes.  For example, mid-level managers may have less 
overall power to make changes, but they are also closer to street-level processes that 
directly affect the outputs and outcomes of the organization.  Similarly, executive 
managers and administrators may be able to have more say in the general direction of the 
organization broadly, but they are not as likely to affect implementation and supply 
chain processes that have the ability to adjust to such visions.  As such, it is important to 
test these categories for differential effects on performance in the analyses below. 
 
 
Figure 2: Average Employee Groups per 100 FTE Students 
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In examining the effect of administrative intensity on organizational 
performance, 150% normal time graduation rates and degrees conferred per 100 full-
time equivalent (FTE) students will be used as dependent variables to measure student 
performance. 26  The former measure is arguably the most common indicator of 
performance for colleges and universities, and it is often a key factor in performance-
funding decisions made by policymakers (Rabovsky 2012).  Graduation rates are 
calculated by dividing the number of students who earned a degree within six years of 
entering college by the revised cohort (total students minus those who passed away, left 
for military service, attended part time, etc.).  For example, a graduation rate reported in 
2012 indicates the percent of students who entered a college or university as first-time, 
full-time freshmen in fall of 2006 and graduated by the fall of 2012.  However, these 
rates exclude a number of student groups (transfer students and part-time students, for 
example) and can be manipulated by either decreasing the size of the freshman class or 
by raising admission standards to admit students who are more likely to graduate within 
six years.  The number of baccalaureate degrees conferred per 100 FTE students, 
commonly referred to as degree production, provides an alternative means to measure 
performance that encompasses several student groups that may not be included in 
graduation rate calculations.  This performance indicator is viewed as a measure of 
efficiency and productivity.  This measure is not highly correlated with graduation (.21) 
                                                          
26 Other performance measures include retention rates, student diversity, or external funding.  These 
measures, however, may be prioritized in different ways by different types of institutions in this study, 
such that it is most logical to focus on graduation and degree production.  
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and provides another source of salient performance information for institutions and state 
policymakers. 
Independent Variables 
 In the first stage of analysis, organizational size and complexity will be key 
independent variables.  Organizational size can be measured either by the total number 
of employees or the total enrollment of students; the correlation for the two variables in 
this dataset is .754.  Though the former is used for analysis in some studies, the latter is 
more appropriate in the context of higher education (Gander 1999).  This also avoids the 
problem of definitional dependency between the dependent and independent variables, 
as the total number of employees is used to calculate administrative intensity.  As the 
distribution of total enrollment is skewed, the log of total enrollment is used in the 
analyses below (the use of logged size is similar to other studies such as Klatzky 1970; 
Simon 1999; and Boyne and Meier 2013). 
 Structural complexity is calculated through the use of the Carnegie classification 
scheme.27  The complexity measure presented here is scaled from 1-4 based on 
groupings of similar Carnegie school types ranging from baccalaureate colleges to 
doctorate-granting universities (see Table 18 in the Appendix for full listing).  
Baccalaureate colleges and master’s colleges each comprise forty percent of the 
                                                          
27 Data was also collected for the number of majors, excluding certificates, each public institution 
currently offers.  The number of associate, bachelor, and graduate degrees were totaled to create another 
test of complexity, as each degree requires some type of administrative coordination.  Though this 
measure represents the current year only and does not extend to private institutions, it was merged with the 
panel data as a constant over time.  Results with this measure are similar to the findings described here, 
though the interaction of size and complexity did not reach significance.  The correlation between the two 
measures of complexity is 0.75 for all public institutions. 
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institution-years while fifteen percent are research universities and five percent are 
doctorate-granting universities.  Though this broad classification scheme may present a 
suboptimal measure of complexity, it stems from a reputable source that has consistently 
classified schools over time.  Further, this approach should present enough power and 
differentiation across organizations to indicate whether complexity is a significant 
determinant of administrative intensity independent of size.28  For instance, a college 
that grants only bachelor’s degrees may be smaller or larger than a college that grants 
doctoral degrees.  The latter organization would be more complex because it must 
administer multiple types of degrees that contain different requirements for students, 
regardless of the size of the institution.   
 In testing the determinants of organizational performance, the key independent 
variable is administrative intensity.  Both measures of administrative intensity mentioned 
above will be used to model student performance to determine if administrative intensity 
has any linear or nonlinear effect on graduation rates and degree production.  Using both 
measures of administration will also indicate what types of administrators are correlated 
with higher performance (Smith and Larimer 2004). 
Control Variables 
 Existing studies of administrative intensity in higher education provide a set of 
control variables for factors internal to the organizations as well as for external 
dependencies.  In addition to the key independent variables of size and complexity, the 
                                                          
28 Complexity and size have a correlation of .70 for the institutions in this study.  While they are expected 
to be correlated (and increase in one is likely to lead to an increase in the other), the two should measure 
somewhat different concepts. 
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percent of employees who are faculty provides an indication of the resource trade-off 
between administrative and front-line employees (a more detailed discussion of this 
trade-off can be found in Ginsberg 2011 and Carlson 2014).  To control for 
organizational dependencies, models include student pricing mechanisms (gross tuition 
and fees revenue),29 government dependency (the percent of funding from government 
sources), and the percentage change in revenue from the previous to the current year.30  
The higher the revenue share the university receives from government entities, the more 
responsive it may be to the state’s interest in limiting administrative intensity.  When 
total revenues decrease, institutions should feel some pressure to limit administrative 
intensity; if the organization experiences an increase in overall revenue, it may have 
higher levels of slack that can support additional administrators.  Finally, it is important 
to control for organizational type.  A dichotomous variable is included to differentiate 
public and private universities.  Public universities may have lower levels of 
administrative intensity as these organizations are likely subject to greater pressure from 
political principals at the state and federal level to comply with a variety of rules and 
regulations.31 
                                                          
29 The measure of revenue for tuition and fees revenue used here includes student aid applied to tuition and 
fees. 
30 Large negative values occurred for a set of universities in 2009, and large positive values occurred for a 
set of universities in 2004. Note that by including the latter change variable, one year of observations will 
not be included in analyses. 
31 A control for historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) is not included here because there is 
no theoretical reason to expect that these institutions will be substantively different.  Models that include a 
control for this dummy variable (not shown) show no difference between HBCUs and other institutions as 
related to the link between organizational structure, administrative intensity, and performance. 
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 Similar to studies of administrative intensity, the literature provides a set of 
institutional structure and student characteristics needed to model student success in the 
second portion of the analysis (Scott, Bailey, and Kienzl 2006).  In addition to 
administrative intensity, structure and resource controls include enrollment, tuition and 
fees, instructional spending per full-time-equivalent student, and full-time-equivalent 
faculty per 100 full-time-equivalent students.  As tuition and fees increase, access for 
students of lower socioeconomic status may decline while graduation rates may 
improve.  Finally, as both instructional spending and the number of faculty increase, we 
should expect graduation rates to increase.  Student characteristics included in 
performance models include student commitment (full-time undergraduates), race and 
ethnicity (the percent of black and Hispanic students), and students with financial need 
(the percent of full-time, first-time undergraduates receiving aid).32  Higher portions of 
full-time students are expected to increase graduation rates, while higher shares of 
minority students have often been linked to lower graduation rates and lower degree 
production.  Additionally, financial need is often correlated with the presence of students 
who either may not persist in college or may take more time to finish a degree.  Both of 
these factors are likely to decrease degree production and graduation rates. 
 Table 8 contains descriptive statistics for the variables in this study.  A clear 
difference stands out between the two measures of administrative intensity.  When only 
executive/managerial positions are included in this variable, the average percent of 
                                                          
32 Measures of ability (75th percentile SAT math and critical reading) were also tested but not included in 
final models as many schools do not report these scores. 
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administrators is 8.19 with a standard deviation of 4.95 percentage points.  However, 
when other professionals are considered, the average size of administrative employees 
triples to 27.71 percent with a standard deviation of 7.68 percentage points.  The two 
dependent variables are both skewed to the right and are not highly correlated (0.39).33 
 
 
 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics, Administrative Intensity in U.S. Higher Education 
Variable Mean S. D. 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
Percent Administrative Staff 
(Executive/Managerial) 8.19 4.95 0.21 41.16 
Percent Administrative Staff (Executive/Managerial 
and Professional) 27.71 7.68 1.52 74.38 
Total Enrollment (logged) 8.23 1.14 5.30 12.41 
Complexity 1.93 1.01 1 4 
Faculty Percent 44.85 10.41 11.91 95.77 
Public University 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Government Reliance 27.51 28.31 0 97.55 
Change in Revenue 5.02 24.47 -290.99 260.45 
150% Graduation Rate  53.48 18.28 5 100 
Completions per 100 FTE Students 25.49 8.49 3.09 107.39 
HBCU 0.05 0.23 0 1 
In-state Tuition and Fees ($1000) 14.34 9.03 0 42.14 
Instructional Spending/FTE Student ($1000) 7.81 6.41 0.02 129.60 
FTE Faculty per FTE 100 Students 5.77 3.07 1.00 91.52 
Percent Full-Time Undergraduates 69.68 19.77 0.78 100 
Percent Black Students 12.45 20.26 0 100 
Percent Hispanic Students 6.25 12.94 0 100 
Percent Full-Time, First-Time Undergraduates 
Receiving Aid 85.46 15.00 0 100 
 
  
                                                          
33 Granger tests were conducted to determine if one type of administrative intensity caused the other or if 
the two variables were independent.  Test with both one and two lags suggest that these two measures are 
independent from each other. 
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Methods 
 Separate methods of analysis will be utilized for each stage of this study.  When 
testing the determinants of administrative intensity, OLS regression with errors clustered 
by institution will be used because the observations within each school may be related in 
some way that is not controlled for directly.34  The inclusion of clustered standard errors 
will prevent bias in inferences by grouping observations in each organization.  Finally, 
because these institutions are autoregressive and change slowly over time, lagged 
dependent variables are also tested.  In stage two, OLS models with school fixed effects 
will be used to determine how administrative intensity affects performance.  Using fixed 
effects in this portion of the analysis will focus on within-institution variance over time.  
In these models, constant variables such as institution type (public-private, HBCU) and 
complexity will be absorbed by the fixed effects.  In other words, the fixed effects will 
soak up across-institution differences, leaving only within-group variance.  This will 
result in a much lower likelihood of omitted variable bias.  Lagged dependent variables 
are not used for these fixed effects models, as this specification may introduce Nickell 
bias.  For all models throughout the analyses present below, year fixed effects are also 
                                                          
34 The use of a fixed effects model is not appropriate in this stage for several reasons.  Fixed effects 
analysis does not allow for the presence of structurally important constants—including whether the 
university is public or private or if it is a historically black college or university—that have no within-unit 
variance.  More importantly, the use of fixed effects would not allow for a clear analysis of the effect of 
complexity on administrative intensity, as the measure of complexity does not change for a single 
institution in the time period included in this study. The Hausman-Taylor estimator was also tested (table 
not shown) to allow for the correlation between individual effects and regressors while allowing the 
inclusion of time invariant regressors.  These findings were not substantially different from those 
presented here. 
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included as to minimize the threat of serial correlation (Stimson 1985); this should 
control for any general increases in any variables over time.   
4.7 Findings 
 Table 9 tests the linear and nonlinear effects of size and structural complexity on 
administrative intensity.35  When focusing on executive managers alone, the effect of 
size has a linear negative effect on administrative intensity.  This finding, dissipates 
when a lagged dependent variable is added to the model; this is perhaps not surprising as 
the lagged dependent variable predicts about 85 percent of the current level of executive 
management, all else equal.  While complexity is certainly correlated with this tier of 
administration (P=.179 in Model 1), it has no significant effect.  Overall, these 
organizations appear to follow the theory of economies of scale as related to size, but no 
other findings support any notion of curvilinear relationships as suggested in previous 
literature (but see similar linear findings in Andrews and Boyne 2009). 
Evidence for curvilinear relationships, however, is provided when both upper and 
mid-level administrators are included in the dependent variable.  Organizational size 
appears to have a strong nonlinear relationship with administrative intensity in these 
models.  Plotting this relationship suggests that the slope does not change signs but only 
approaches zero.  This notion of diminishing returns is parallel to other recent research 
on administration in public schools (Boyne and Meier 2013) and local governments 
                                                          
35 Similar findings to those presented in Table 9 were also detected in a fixed effects model (not shown).  
As complexity cannot be included in the fixed effects model, the sample was split by complexity, and size 
was included as the primary independent variable.  Organizational size had a nonlinear U-shaped 
relationship in one of three models on executive administration and two of three models for all 
administration. 
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(Ting et al. 2013).  Beyond size, complexity has a positive relationship with 
administrative intensity that is initially significant but substantively small (a one unit 
increase in complexity, or a one unit shift in Carnegie classification, in the base model is 
associated with a one percentage point increase in administrative intensity).  This would 
imply that, at least in terms of size, administration may not be as bloated as popular 
media might suggest. 
Though not the primary focus of this study, control variables also merit note.  
Revenue dependencies do not appear to have a strong effect on administrative intensity, 
but public institutions have significantly lower levels of administrative intensity as 
compared to their private counterparts.  As expected, higher shares of faculty in the total 
employee pool are linked to lower levels of administration.  Finally, adding a lagged 
dependent variable to these models subsumes much of the explained variance as these 
organizations are highly autoregressive over time.   
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Table 9: Determinants of Administrative Intensity in Higher Education, 2003-2009 
 
Executive/Managerial 
Executive/Managerial and 
Professional   
Internal Factors       
Total enrollment 
(logged) -0.855*** -2.195* 0.253 -1.190*** -9.017*** -2.245*** 
 (0.165) (1.189) (0.338) (0.265) (0.473) (0.706) 
Total enrollment 
(logged)2  0.080 -0.018  0.473*** 0.122*** 
  (0.067) (0.019)  (0.133) (0.042) 
Complexity -0.193 0.332 -0.138 1.187*** 0.642 0.176 
 (0.144) (0.836) (0.152) (0.230) (0.894) (0.254) 
Complexity2  0.173 0.019  0.074 -0.004 
  (0.611) (0.028)  (0.178) (0.050) 
Faculty percent -0.069*** -0.069*** 
-
0.019*** -0.409*** -0.403*** -0.108*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) 
External 
Dependencies 
and Control       
Government 
Dependency 0.006 0.006 -0.004 0.018 0.013 -0.005 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.014) (0.015) (0.004) 
Change in 
Revenue 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.002 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Public -3.046*** -3.095*** -0.242* -3.509*** -3.377*** -0.115 
 (0.538) (0.543) (0.141) (0.846) (0.878) (0.257) 
Administrative 
Intensity lag   0.859***   0.809*** 
   (0.010)   (0.017) 
Constant 
19.653**
* 
24.851**
* 1.316 
53.456**
* 
85.797**
* 
19.923**
* 
  (1.170) (5.015) (1.446) (1.756) (8.905) (3.254) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 .24 .24 .81 .40 .40 .83 
Schools 1341 1341 1341 1341 1341 1341 
N 7307 7307 7307 7287 7287 7287 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10     
Errors clustered by institution     
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The results thus far provide only limited support for nonlinear hypotheses related 
to organizational size and largely reject hypotheses related to organizational complexity.  
The former findings are consistent with the logic of economies of scale while the latter 
suggests that there are likely to be other contextual factors that influence the growth (or 
decline) of administrative intensity in this sample of organizations.  The results should 
not be interpreted to mean that organizational complexity is completely unrelated to 
administrative intensity, only that it has little to no direct impact.  It is quite possible that 
organizational complexity may influence a number of internal characteristics of the 
organization that have a stronger link to administration.  It may also be possible that 
complexity has little independent effect but that it interacts with organizational size to 
affect administrative intensity (as suggested by Blau 1970 and empirically detected by 
Andrews and Boyne 2014).  An interaction between size (logged) and complexity is 
included in Table 10 below.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the interaction is not significant for 
the restricted definition of administrative intensity.  The persistent null findings related 
to this dependent variable may be related to the lack of change in the share of these 
employees over the range of time in this study.   
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Table 10: Determinants of Administrative Intensity in Higher Education, Interactive 
Effects 
 
Executive/Managerial 
Executive/Managerial 
and Professional   
Internal Factors     
Total enrollment (logged) -2.054* 0.284 -5.506** -1.524 
 (1.264) (0.389) (2.188) (0.728) 
Total enrollment (logged)2 0.064 -0.021 0.073 0.040 
 (0.084) (0.027) (0.159) (0.051) 
Complexity 0.124 -0.220 -4.718** -0.898* 
 (1.113) (0.327) (1.879) (0.553) 
Complexity2 -0.105 0.013 -0.562** -0.135** 
 (0.141) (0.034) (0.220) (0.063) 
Enrollment X Complexity 0.043 0.009 1.080*** 0.223*** 
 (0.145) (0.043) (0.273) (0.081) 
Faculty percent -0.069*** -0.019*** -0.398*** -0.108*** 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.018) (0.012) 
External Dependencies and Control     
Government Dependency 0.006 -0.004 0.018 -0.003 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.015) (0.004) 
Change in Revenue 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Public -3.106*** -0.244* -3.649*** -0.178 
 (0.145) (0.143) (0.867) (0.254) 
Administrative Intensity lag  0.859***  0.808*** 
  (0.010)  (0.017) 
Constant 24.328*** 1.395 74.694*** 18.129*** 
  (5.260) (1.619) (8.817) (3.313) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 .24 .24 .40 .40 
Schools 1341 1341 1341 1341 
N 7307 7307 7287 7287 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10     
Errors clustered by institution     
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For total administration, however, there exists a much stronger interactive effect 
of size and complexity.  To better understand this interaction while accounting for the 
linear and nonlinear terms in the model, marginal effects can be plotted to determine the 
influence of one structural variable on administrative intensity as the other changes 
(Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).  The left portion of Figure 3 provides a graphical 
illustration of the moderating influence of organizational size as complexity increases.  
While increasing complexity appears to lessen the negative effect of size, the confidence 
intervals suggest that this change is not significantly different from zero and does not 
cause the effect of size to change sign. The right portion of Figure 3 shows that 
organizational size accelerates the positive effect of complexity on administrative 
intensity.  The effect of complexity in large organizations will be greater than in smaller 
organizations as it is likely that more administrators will be needed to coordinate a larger 
group of front-line staff.  In other words, in two organizations of equal complexity, 
differences in size will affect how many administrators are needed to oversee each sub-
unit.  This may relate to the absolute number of employees one administrator has the 
capacity to oversee at any given time. 
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Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Size and Complexity on Administrative Intensity 
 
 
Taken together, organizational size and structural complexity seem to be poor 
causal predictors of executive managerial positions in four-year institutions of higher 
education in the United States.  One explanation is that every university needs a similar 
set of executives to run the organization (each university, regardless of size or 
complexity, needs a president, provost or chief academic officer, and a vice president of 
research, for example).  These positions may change little in the short-term such that 
variance in size and complexity are not causally linked to this portion of administration.  
On the other hand, size and complexity have a much greater impact on the share of total 
administrative intensity (top and mid-level managers).  Executives likely have more 
discretion to determine the need for mid-level management such that the demand for 
these administrators may be driven by organizational growth and the specialization of 
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subunits.  These administrators are not only making strategic plans and developing 
visions of future organizational performance, but they are the individuals overseeing 
front-line employees and clientele needs.  Thus, more difficult and more specialized 
tasks that also require increased interactions with a larger body of front-line employees 
and clientele create larger demands on the limited time and resources of each 
administrator.  Additional micro-level mechanisms should be explored in multiple 
organizational contexts to determine how generalizable the linkages among size, 
complexity, and administration are and what other factors may be an important part of 
this organizational calculus. 
 While the determinants of administrative intensity should not be overlooked, the 
primary focus of this study is to determine whether the size of administration has any 
significant impact on organizational performance.  Existing literature rarely tests 
whether administrative intensity has substantive effects on performance, but much 
research in public management finds that the characteristics of and strategic actions 
taken by upper and mid-level managers matter for the performance of public 
organizations (O’Toole and Meier 1999, 2000; O’Toole, Meier, and Nicholson-Crotty 
2004; Hicklin, O’Toole, and Meier 2008).   This literature largely agrees that those at the 
top of the organization have an important effect on performance (O’Toole and Meier 
1999; Juenke 2005; Fernandez 2005; Jacobson et al. 2010).  However, the effect of 
middle managers, many of which are included in the broader definition of administrative 
intensity here, is widely debated.  As priorities shifted to quality, efficiency, and speed 
during the era of New Public Management, middle managers were seen as unnecessary 
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in organizations that needed to “trim the fat” (Cohen and Brand 1993).  In the case of 
higher education, additional administrators, especially those classified as other 
professional, may provide higher levels of student services that bolster the well-being 
and performance of the student body as a whole (this may occur through health services, 
academic tutoring, or some other provision).  However, further increases in these types 
of personnel may have diminishing returns.  These additional positions may also require 
trade-offs with other needs (most prominently faculty hires). 
To test the effect of administrative intensity on organizational performance, both 
measures of administrative intensity will be used to model student success, measured by 
graduation rates and degree production.  These performance indicators are often used by 
political principals and other stakeholder groups to determine whether institutions of 
higher education are performing above or below expectations.  Table 11 shows the 
relationship between administrative intensity and graduation rates.36  Neither measure of 
administration has a significant direct effect on performance in these models.  In fact, the 
only factors that are consistently related to graduation rates in these models are student 
profile characteristics.  Though not assessed in this study, it is possible that while 
administrators have no direct effect on graduation rates, they are likely to make 
decisions (related to price setting, financial aid and scholarship packages, admissions 
standards, and transfer credits) that have some influence on the profile of the student 
body.  Thus, there may still be some channel by which the share of administrators may 
                                                          
36 A model with clustered standard errors and a lagged dependent variable was also examined.  In this 
model, total administration (executive/managerial and other professionals) had a nonlinear relationship 
with graduation rates and produced a tipping point of approximately 26 percent administration.   
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influence strategic decisions which will produce some indirect effect on organizational 
performance. 
 
 
 
Table 11: The Effect of Administrative Intensity on Graduation Rates 
DV: 150% Graduation Rates  
Executive/Managerial 
Executive/Managerial 
and Professional 
Institutional Structure and 
Resources  
  
 
Administrative  Intensity -0.019 0.017 -0.024 0.058 
 (0.032) (0.080) (0.022) (0.075) 
Administrative Intensity2  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Total Enrollment (logged) 0.776 0.788 0.432 0.499 
 (0.958) (0.959) (0.955) (0.957) 
In-state Tuition and fees ($1000) 0.035 0.034 0.023 0.021 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) 
Instructional spending/FTE student 
($1000) 0.095 0.095 0.105 0.105 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.072) (0.072) 
FTE Faculty per FTE 100 students -0.033 -0.033 -0.056 -0.050 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) 
Student Characteristics     
Percent full-time undergraduates -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Percent black students 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.090* 0.089* 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Percent Hispanic students 0.295*** 0.294*** 0.276*** 0.277*** 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.092) (0.092) 
Percent full-time, first-time students 
w/ aid -0.022* -0.022* -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant 44.592*** 44.353*** 48.434*** 46.701*** 
  (8.787) (8.801) (8.827) (8.955) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 .06 .06 .05 .05 
Schools 1381 1381 1379 1379 
N 8937 8937 8874 8874 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10       
Includes institutional fixed effects       
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It may also be possible that administrative intensity affects some types of 
performance but not others due to trade-offs among multiple organizational goals (Smith 
and Larimer 2004).  Table 12 examines whether any impact of administration is detected 
when performance is measured by degree production (the number of baccalaureate 
degrees per 100 full-time equivalent students), a performance indicator that is only 
moderately correlated with graduation.37  Models for the limited measure of 
administration find, once again, that this type of administrative intensity is unrelated to 
student performance.  However, the more encompassing measure of administration 
provides the first support for the nonlinear hypotheses that the share of administration is 
related to performance.  Similar to research on cost efficiencies by Martin and Hill 
(2012), an inflection point occurs at 30 percent of administrative intensity in Model 4.  
This means that for increases in administration below 30 percent, more administrative 
intensity may help improve this performance output.  However, once the share of 
administration surpasses this tipping point, the relationship shifts so that increasing 
levels of administration are negatively related to degree production.  This implies that if 
too many resources are diverted from instruction, research, or other student services to 
administration, organizational performance will suffer.  In the sample of institutions used 
in this study, 65 percent were below this turning point while the remaining 35 percent 
have surpassed this point.  Findings here suggest that the latter group can improve 
degree production by decreasing administrative intensity in favor of using these 
resources on other programs aimed at helping student performance (of course, there may 
                                                          
37 A model with clustered standard errors and a lagged dependent variable produced similar findings. 
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be countless unintended consequences or complications that make this type of 
recommendation impractical as a best practice). 
 
 
 
Table 12: The Effect of Administrative Intensity on Degree Production 
DV: Degrees/100 FTE Students 
Executive/Managerial 
Executive/Managerial 
and Professional 
Institutional Structure and 
Resources  
  
 
Administrative  Intensity -0.021 -0.022 -0.016* 0.060* 
 (0.014) (0.036) (0.009) (0.034) 
Administrative Intensity2  0.00002  -0.001** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Total Enrollment (logged) -7.911*** -7.911*** -7.702*** -7.641*** 
 (0.432) (0.432) (0.435) (0.436) 
In-state Tuition and fees ($1000) -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.104*** -0.105*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Instructional spending/FTE 
student ($1000) 0.321*** 0.321*** 0.188*** 0.188*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033) 
FTE Faculty per FTE 100 students 0.083** 0.083** 0.088** 0.094** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) 
Student Characteristics     
Percent full-time undergraduates -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.197*** -0.198*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Percent black students -0.072*** -0.072*** 0.082*** -0.083*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Percent Hispanic students 0.107** 0.107** 0.088** 0.089** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Percent full-time, first-time 
students w/ aid -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 102.922*** 102.926*** 102.080*** 100.495*** 
  (3.961) (3.968) (4.023) (4.080) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 .12 .12 .10 .10 
Schools 1381 1381 1379 1379 
N 8937 8937 8874 8874 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10                           
Includes institutional fixed effects       
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In Tables 11 and 12, the control variables have slightly different levels of 
influence on performance.  While size (enrollment) and the percent of undergraduates 
are highly significant for estimating degree production, these variables are insignificant 
in graduation models.  For both performance indicators, the percent of full-time 
undergraduates is negatively related to performance, while higher levels of Hispanic 
students helps to boost performance.  At the institutional level, instructional spending 
per FTE student is positive, though this variable is only significant for degree 
production. 
4.8 Implications 
This study has focused on questions of the determinants of administrative 
intensity and the subsequent effect of administrative intensity on organizational 
performance.  The findings in this study provide support for theories of economies of 
scale related to organizational size but lack support for an independent effect of 
complexity on administration.  Size and complexity have an interactive effect on total 
administrative intensity in these organizations such that complexity has a strong positive 
relationship with administrative intensity in larger organizations.  Multiple definitions of 
administration clearly illustrate that structural relationships depend on measurement and 
specification that must consider the internal and external context of the organization.  In 
the context of U.S. higher education, top level administration is more stagnant than the 
total size of administration, so the latter is more like to be affected by organizational 
structures, all else equal. 
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Unlike previous research, this paper tested the link between administrative 
intensity and organizational performance and found it to be significant for one of two 
student performance indicators.  When administration includes staff classified as “other 
professionals,” administrative intensity has a nonlinear, inverted U-shaped relationship 
with degree production and suggests that optimal levels of administrative intensity occur 
when administrative employees comprise approximately 30 percent of all employees in 
the organization.  However, a similar relationship is not found in the case of graduation 
rates.  Such mixed findings suggest that administration directly affects some 
performance goals but may not have the same relationship with others.  Practically, this 
implies that determining the size and scope of administration in these organizations may 
be a complex task.   
Theoretically, this study emphasizes the need to expand current theories of 
organizational structure to incorporate a stronger understanding of the relationship 
among organizational structures as well as how structural components like 
administrative intensity influence organizational performance.  The nonlinear 
relationship reported here, while previously absent from the literature, is perhaps not 
surprising.  Increasing resources for one component of an organization requires trade-
offs among other services and priorities and can have negative implications for other 
organizational needs.  On the other hand, as arguments provided by Smith and Meier 
(1994, 1995) suggest, organizations with too few administrators are also linked to lower 
performance.  However, the lack of consistent nonlinear findings across performance 
indicators underscores the need for scholars and practitioners alike to consider when and 
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why administrative intensity might matter but also when it might have no relationship or 
indirect relationships with performance.  Tracing out the linkages that connect 
administration to performance theoretically can then allow for a better understanding of 
when we should expect administration to matter. 
Much additional work is needed in this line of inquiry.  First, definitions of key 
concepts remain problematic.  This study provides an illustration of how relationships 
may vary based on which employees are classified as administrators.  When the size and 
complexity of an organization increase, some types of administrative employees may 
decrease while others increase; this is seen in higher education when 
executive/managerial employees remain relatively stable in number over time, while 
those classified as other professionals experience more movement and growth.  Here, 
employees encompassed our limited measure of administration are likely in charge of 
decisions to hire other professionals and mid-level managers.  While those at the top 
remain steady over time, they may choose whether to increase the share of other 
administrators as the size, complexity, or other components of the organization shift over 
time.  As existing literature contains a number of approaches to defining size (number of 
employees, number of students/clients), complexity (number of departments, client 
composition), and performance (for education these may include standardized tests, 
graduation rates, retention, dropouts), identifying some level of consensus in 
measurement across policy areas may limit the consistency of findings.   
Second, tests are needed to verify whether findings from institutions of higher 
education are generalizable to other contexts.  The organizations in this study vary in the 
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components of interest (size, structure, administrative intensity) as well as in terms of 
centralization, formalization, and control by political principals across all U.S. states, 
which may allow the findings to hold across agencies in other policy areas.  Higher 
education, however, may have more or less flexibility to manage levels of administrative 
intensity than other organizations which may limit the extension of the conclusions made 
in this study.  Third, while this study focuses on the concentration of administrators, it 
does not extend to the change in the cost of these employees.  Holding the size of 
administration constant, the cost of these employees may change over time and have 
positive or negative implications for organizational processes and performance 
outcomes. 
Despite these potential limitations, the notion that an ideal level of administration 
can be identified to maximize performance should influence how scholars consider 
managerial priorities and decisions.  Determining when and why managers deter from 
setting administration at a level conducive for maximizing performance may relate to 
political relationships, managerial quality, or managerial fit.  Further, these optimal 
levels may vary for low and high performing institutions and may be strategically 
maneuvered in order to achieve goals that may work in conjunction or compete with the 
goals examined here. 
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5. CONCLUSION: ARE ALL MANANGERS ALIKE? 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Understanding when and how managers affect the performance of their organizations is 
a question that will continue to drive a large share of public administration research.  In 
the context of higher education, this question is highly salient as the value of U.S. higher 
education is no longer solidly positioned at the top of the world market.  How is this so?  
In global rankings, eight of the top ten universities are located in the United States.  
American institutions produce the most scientific output and gain attention for a plethora 
of Nobel laureates (“Not what it Used to be” 2012).  Yet, rising tuition and fees mean 
higher levels of debt and uncertainty about opportunity costs and future returns.  Further, 
not all who begin a college education will finish, as the typical graduation rate for an 
institution of higher education is no higher than promising a degree for two out of every 
three students.  Unfortunately, those living in lower socioeconomic levels and those of 
minority racial and ethnic groups are among the first to lose out, which contributes to 
widening and already large gap between the haves and have-nots.  Connecting education 
to economic development and job creation is no longer seen as a robust assumption by 
many stakeholders who call for vast changes in state institutions. 
In a recent policy brief by the American Association of State Colleges and 
Universities (AASCU) identified the number one issue facing higher education as 
boosting institutional performance (AASCU 2013).  States have begun to work with one 
another or with third party organizations to boost degree production, and many have 
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implemented policies focusing on strengthening STEM education.  State performance-
funding policies continue to expand rather than contract, which may further test the 
waters of institutional-state relationships when disagreement occurs over which 
outcomes are rewarded and whether these outcomes apply equally to all schools. 
As policies continue to push institutions to improve access, quality, and 
affordability simultaneously, university presidents are caught in an iron triangle of 
competing goals that necessarily include trade-offs.  And while presidents may all want 
to improve performance, many do not know which strategies will lead to improvements 
or how long it will take to experience such improvements once a new policy is 
implemented.  These managers are now public figures who have become associated with 
politics in many states, which adds additional pressure to decision making processes. 
In this dissertation, I have examined three linkages of the model presented in the 
introduction—managerial fit, the drivers of decision making, and administrative 
intensity.  Managerial fit, financial changes, and administrative intensity all have the 
capacity to affect organizational performance in direct and indirect ways.  Findings here 
suggest that change is generally incremental but that presidents can affect performance 
under certain circumstances.  Interestingly, moderation appears to be important in this 
context—some, but not too much fit and some, but not too much administrative 
intensity.  
5.2 Implications for Theory 
 The community of education scholars and administrators often give little direct 
attention to policy issues that affect institutional structures, decisions, and performance 
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feedback loops.  When policy is considered, education scholars generally focus on 
drivers of state-level change without considering institutional-level consequences.  
Studying these phenomenon at the institutional level through the lens of public 
administration and political science theories in this work demonstrate that much can be 
gained for scholars in multiple fields for explaining organizational performance for 
complex systems that are experiencing some level of uncertainty in external 
environment.  And while volumes of research exist on organizational performance, we 
know relatively little about how the individual characteristics and values of managers 
shape decision making, change, and performance in a general way. 
 More specifically, one of the primary takeaways from these studies is that the fit 
of managers can have a number of consequences throughout the organization.  Here, I 
focused on a single conceptualization of fit for a specific set of performance outcome 
indicators.  This should be the tipping point of exploring other measures of fit and 
additional dependent variables (throughput and output measures).  Scholars in public 
administration and political science have yet to maximize the potential of this theoretical 
discussion. 
 Next, scholars should have a renewed skepticism of the role of strategic plans.  
While plans may be normatively good, they may be less useful in practice when a wide 
network of individuals must support the implementation of such a plan.  However, it 
must also be noted that the findings in this paper may lead to at least two conclusions—
that strategic plans are rarely more than incremental shifts that are hard to predict or that 
strategic plans are difficult to measure with macro-level data.  Further, as the second and 
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third empirical chapters illustrate, change may occur through monetary and non-
monetary means.  Capacity and change in some areas may be more flexible than others 
(especially in light of state and federal regulations). 
5.3 Implications for Practice 
 The research presented here can also speak to practitioners and policymakers.  
First, the hiring process for university presidents is one that is complex and full of 
political processes.  Findings in the first empirical chapter suggest that governing boards 
should consider thinking slightly outside of the box, but doing so may also have a 
number of additional political implications.  Additionally, the role of board is one that 
has not yet been addressed in this research due to data limitations.  Yet, governing 
boards often consist of members that are appointed by a governor and who have a wide 
range of knowledge about higher education.  The role of these individuals and how they 
align with a presidential candidate is also likely to be important.   
 Second, research on the connection of fit and performance in the case of higher 
education should also be extended to provosts and chief academic officers.  As these 
individuals are tasked largely with managing internal affairs while presidents handle 
external relations and fundraising, determining who to hire in these positions and 
whether there is a similar fit-performance link can also be quite informative for 
university boards and administrators.  
 Next, while this research may provide useful points of information for avid 
readers, it stops short of promising to provide best practices that can or should work at 
any individual institution.  Context will be largely important here as significant 
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differences may exist between public and private institutions, high and low performance 
institutions, and institutions in states with unified versus diverse governing systems.  
Further, this study does not consider all four year schools and does not address two years 
schools at all.  These systems often have widely different missions (though some of 
these missions are shifting).  Finally, while mentioned in passing throughout this 
research, fit, strategic change, and administrative intensity, among many other aspects of 
higher education, may have distributional consequences for different student groups.  
Administrators should be aware of how decisions affect each of these groups and should 
take caution to avoid unfairly disadvantaging any single groups of students. 
5.4 Limitations 
 A few additional limitations should also be considered in this research.  While 
policymakers and stakeholders often call for performance improvements that should 
occur quickly, institutional change resulting from many managerial decisions may not be 
seen for a number of years.  Many administrators are acutely aware that some of the 
more strategic changes in their institutions may not be measurable for 4-6 years as old 
cohorts of students complete their degrees and incoming classes, experiences all of the 
potential benefits of the changes, get through the system.  This long wait time may drive 
much of the incremental changes that were detected in the second empirical chapter and 
may explain why large, more risky shifts are much less common.  Of course, salient 
discussions of the need for drastic, prompt changes can also encourage administrators to 
take actions that have faster results but also include challenges for goals such as equity 
and accessibility.   
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  In terms of theory, there is a need to duplicate and expand these studies in other 
areas of higher education (other four year institutions, two year institutions, non-US 
institutions) to see how robust findings are across time and space.  Replication is also 
useful in other sectors (health, welfare, public safety, local governments) to determine if 
findings here apply only to the case of higher education or if they can accurately be 
applied in a more general sense to models of management and performance.   
 To conclude, no easy answers exist for understanding management questions 
generally or for maximizing performance, affordability, and accessibility in higher 
education specifically.  Still, this research can help to move both fronts forward to 
increase knowledge among scholars, practitioners, and policymakers alike. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 13: Determinants of Performance, Internal Hires Included 
  Degrees/100 FTE Students 150% Graduation Rate FTFT Retention Rate 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Organizational Fit -0.0669 -1.4272 -0.1997 9.1166+ -0.6701+ 15.0325+ 
  (0.0955) (1.6860) (0.1874) (4.7956) (0.3925) (8.9236) 
Organizational Fit2  0.0941  -0.6690+  -1.1247+ 
   (0.1176)  (0.3471)  (0.6381) 
Prior Organization Performance (Degrees) 0.0176 0.0171      
  (0.0169) (0.0168)      
Prior Organization Performance (Grad)   0.0082 0.0081    
    (0.0067) (0.0064)    
Prior Organization Performance (Ret)     0.0496* 0.0528* 
      (0.0229) (0.0232) 
Change in President 0.0982 0.0947 0.0086 0.1174 0.2618 0.4939 
  (0.1501) (0.1503) (0.3641) (0.3835) (0.6162) (0.6559) 
President Experience (years) -0.0106 -0.0119 0.1098* 0.1120* 0.0314 0.0394 
  (0.0098) (0.0101) (0.0375) (0.0363) (0.0396) (0.0399) 
Percent Black Students -0.0118* -0.0122* -0.0191+ -0.0188+ -0.0129 -0.0126 
  (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0164) (0.0159) 
Percent Hispanic Students 0.0083 0.0082 -0.0323 -0.0303 -0.0065 -0.0007 
  (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0290) (0.0307) (0.0336) (0.0355) 
Percent Part-time Students 0.0234* 0.0236* -0.1138* -0.1205* -0.1238* -0.1322* 
  (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0232) (0.0235) (0.0460) (0.0477) 
Instructional Expenditures/FTE Student (log) 0.4982* 0.4909* 0.5753* 0.6421* 1.8509* 1.9507* 
  (0.1765) (0.1735) (0.2800) (0.2799) (0.6818) (0.6837) 
Sticker Price Tuition and Fees (logged) 0.3705* 0.3767* 0.3752 0.3339 0.4266 0.3362 
  (0.1295) (0.1293) (0.2624) (0.2495) (0.3912) (0.3898) 
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Table 13 Continued        
       
Enrollment (log) -0.1693 -0.1712 0.6946* 0.6868* 0.9491* 0.9341* 
  (0.1280) (0.1284) (0.1941) (0.1919) (0.3814) (0.3850) 
Percent Part-time Faculty 0.0035 0.0034 0.0014 0.0014 0.0288* 0.0270+ 
  (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0080) (0.0077) (0.0142) (0.0140) 
State Performance Funding Policy  -0.0651 -0.0651 -0.0686 -0.0864 -0.0575 -0.0823 
  (0.1272) (0.1270) (0.2320) (0.2286) (0.4383) (0.4413) 
State Appropriations (Constant 2009 dollars, 
millions) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
State Unemployment Rate -0.0172 -0.0154 -0.1555+ -0.1684+ -0.0033 -0.0083 
  (0.0396) (0.0395) (0.0923) (0.0920) (0.1415) (0.1427) 
Lagged DV 0.8390* 0.8389* 0.9003* 0.8975* 0.7114* 0.7027* 
  (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0967) (0.0980) 
Constant -1.7563 3.1718 -5.0412 -37.0840* -4.7942 -58.5508+ 
  (1.5557) (6.1141) (3.7209) (17.4995) (6.8859) (31.5839) 
Year FE 1994-2009 1994-2009 2003-2009 2003-2009 2005-2009 2005-2009 
N 2113 2113 642 642 411 411 
R2 .86 .86 .95 .95 .91 .92 
Chi2 9613.629 10259.462 59275.535 64299.403 3993.022 4625.565 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05       
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Table 14: Determinants of Performance, Presidents from Outside Higher Education 
  
Degrees/100 FTE 
Students 150% Graduation Rate FTFT Retention Rate 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Prior Public Agency -0.1954  -0.0427  0.4929   
  (0.1546)  (0.2852)  (0.7942)   
Prior Private Firm 0.0566  0.9510  5.0513   
  (0.2481)  (0.7391)  (3.3777)   
Prior Public/Private with Ed Experience  -0.1705  0.9812  4.1131 
   (0.2323)  (0.6806)  (2.5902) 
Prior Public/Private without Ed Experience  -0.1018  0.0144  0.6569 
   (0.1632)  (0.2933)  (0.9562) 
Change in President 0.0795 0.0792 -0.3357 -0.3592 0.3065 0.3347 
  (0.1150) (0.1143) (0.3222) (0.3231) (0.4462) (0.4538) 
President Experience (years) -0.0066 -0.0067 0.0081 0.0078 0.1342* 0.1436* 
  (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0219) (0.0217) (0.0467) (0.0458) 
Percent Black Students -0.0082* -0.0079* -0.0233* -0.0239* -0.0574* -0.0611* 
  (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0241) (0.0241) 
Percent Hispanic Students 0.0035 0.0027 -0.0156 -0.0158 -0.0414 -0.0452 
  (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0609) (0.0615) 
Percent Part-time Students 0.0160* 0.0168* -0.0596* -0.0592* -0.3342* -0.3277* 
  (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0136) (0.0128) (0.0692) (0.0688) 
Instructional Expenditures/FTE Student (log) 0.2005 0.1878 0.7725* 0.7914* 3.9161* 4.0709* 
  (0.1254) (0.1222) (0.2389) (0.2338) (0.9452) (0.9383) 
Sticker Price Tuition and Fees (logged) 0.3994* 0.4036* 0.5229* 0.4867* 2.9555* 2.8394* 
  (0.0808) (0.0804) (0.1936) (0.1822) (0.7821) (0.7332) 
Enrollment (log) -0.1325 -0.1339 0.4507* 0.4013* 4.2717* 4.0713* 
  (0.0865) (0.0847) (0.1892) (0.1770) (0.8112) (0.7579) 
Percent Part-time Faculty 0.0004 0.0002 0.0063 0.0074 0.0054 0.0075 
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Table 14 Continued        
       
  (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0230) (0.0230) 
State Performance Funding Policy  0.0037 0.0156 -0.1489 -0.1568 -1.6031* -1.6021* 
  (0.0977) (0.0952) (0.1943) (0.1929) (0.6744) (0.6922) 
State Appropriations (Constant 2009 dollars, 
millions) 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001+ 0.0001+ 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
State Unemployment Rate -0.0548+ -0.0510 -0.1068 -0.0977 -0.3176* -0.3010* 
  (0.0311) (0.0313) (0.0725) (0.0708) (0.1500) (0.1428) 
Lagged DV 0.8696* 0.8724* 0.9137* 0.9144* 0.1600* 0.1562* 
  (0.0187) (0.0182) (0.0146) (0.0141) (0.0599) (0.0598) 
Constant -0.1984 -0.2003 -8.4042* -7.8830* -28.2330* -26.6877* 
  (1.1054) (1.0669) (2.4151) (2.2228) (9.7805) (9.4053) 
Year FE 1994-2009 1994-2009 2003-2009 2003-2009 2005-2009 2005-2009 
N 3492 3515 1500 1510 980 986 
R2 .87 .87 .96 .96 .72 .72 
Chi2 18565.566 19088.084 73623.409 73897.965 947.341 940.225 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05       
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Figure 4: Average Research-Related Share of Expenditures over Time 
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Figure 5: Average Part-Time Faculty/100 FTE Students over Time 
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Figure 6: Average Discount Rate over Time 
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Table 15: Description of Staff Categories 
Variable Definition 
Executive and Managerial Employees A primary function or occupational activity category 
used to classify persons whose assignments require 
management of the institution, or a customarily 
recognized department or subdivision thereof. 
Assignments require the performance of work 
directly related to management policies or general 
business operations of the institution, department or 
subdivision. Assignments in this category 
customarily and regularly require the incumbent to 
exercise discretion and independent judgment.  
 
 
 
Other Professional Employees A primary function or occupational activity category 
used to classify persons employed for the primary 
purpose of performing academic support, student 
service, and institutional support, whose assignments 
would require either a baccalaureate degree or higher 
or experience of such kind and amount as to provide 
a comparable background.  
 
 
 
Technical and Paraprofessional 
Employees 
A primary function or occupational activity category 
used to classify persons whose assignments require 
specialized knowledge or skills which may be 
acquired through experience, apprenticeship, on-the-
job-training, or academic work in occupationally 
specific programs that result in a 2-year degree or 
other certificate or diploma.  
 
 
 
 
Clerical and Secretarial Employees A primary function or occupational activity category 
used to classify persons whose assignments typically 
are associated with clerical activities or are 
specifically of a secretarial nature. Includes 
personnel who are responsible for internal and 
external communications, recording and retrieval of 
data and/or information and other paperwork 
required in an office. 
 
 
 
 
Craft Employees A primary function or occupational activity category 
used to classify persons whose assignments typically 
require special manual skills and a thorough and 
comprehensive knowledge of the processes involved 
in the work, acquired through on-the-job-training 
and experience or through apprenticeship or other 
formal training programs.  
 
 
 
 
Service/Maintenance Employees A primary function or occupational activity category 
used to classify persons whose assignments require 
limited degrees of previously acquired skills and 
knowledge and in which workers perform duties that 
contribute to the comfort, convenience, and hygiene 
of personnel and the student body or that contribute 
to the upkeep of the institutional property.   
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Table 18: Carnegie Codes by Level of Complexity 
Complexity Level Carnegie Classifications 
1 21 = Baccalaureate Colleges--Arts & Sciences 
22 = Baccalaureate Colleges--Diverse Fields 
23 = Baccalaureate/Associate's Colleges 
 
 
2 18 = Master's Colleges and Universities (larger programs)  
19 = Master's Colleges and Universities (medium programs)  
20 = Master's Colleges and Universities (smaller programs) 
 
 
3 17 = Doctoral/Research Universities: Doctorate-granting 
Universities  
 
4 15 = Research Universities (very high research activity) 
16 = Research Universities (high research activity)  
 
 
